

make such a representation of it to ourselves, what origin this idea has, whether it is to be found in an *a priori* source, and also what the scope and boundary of its use are; in a word, such an inquiry will belong as a part to the system of the critique of pure reason, but not to doctrinal philosophy.

III.

On the system
of all the faculties of the human mind.

We can trace all faculties of the human mind without exception back to these three: the **faculty of cognition**, the **feeling of pleasure and displeasure**, and the **faculty of desire**. To be sure, philosophers who otherwise deserve nothing but praise for the thoroughness of their way of thinking have sought to explain this distinction as merely illusory and to reduce all faculties to the mere faculty of cognition.² But it can easily be demonstrated, and has already been understood for some time,³ that this attempt to bring unity into the multiplicity of faculties, although undertaken in a genuinely philosophical spirit, is futile. For there is always a great difference between representations belonging to cognition, insofar as they are related merely to the object and the unity of the consciousness of it, and their objective relation where, considered as at the same time the cause of the reality of this object, they are assigned to the faculty of desire, and, finally,^a their relation merely to the subject, where they are considered merely as grounds for preserving their own existence in it and to this extent in relation to the feeling of pleasure; the latter is absolutely not a cognition, nor does it provide one, although to be sure it may presuppose such a cognition as a determining ground.

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The connection between the cognition of an object and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure in its existence, or the determination of the faculty of desire to produce it, is certainly empirically knowable; but since this interconnection is not grounded in any principle *a priori*, to this extent the powers of the mind constitute only an **aggregate** and not a system. Now it is surely enough to produce a connection *a priori* between the feeling of pleasure and the other two faculties if we connect a cognition *a priori*, namely the rational concept of freedom, with the faculty of desire as its determining ground, at the same time subjectively finding in this objective determination a feeling of pleasure contained in the determination of the will.^{b,4} But in this way the faculty

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^a “finally” crossed out by Kant.

^b Crossed out by Kant: “as in fact found to be identical with the former.”

of cognition is not combined with the faculty of desire **by means of** the pleasure or displeasure, for this does not precede the latter faculty,^a but either first succeeds the determination of it, or else is perhaps nothing other than the sensation of the determinability of the will through reason itself, thus not a special feeling and distinctive receptivity that requires a special section under the properties of the mind. Now since in the analysis^b of the faculties of the mind in general a feeling of pleasure which is independent of the determination of the faculty of desire, which indeed is rather able to supply a determining ground for that faculty, is incontrovertibly given, the connection of which with the other two faculties in a system nevertheless requires that this feeling of pleasure, like the other two faculties, not rest on merely empirical grounds but also on *a priori* principles, there is thus required for the idea of philosophy as a system (if not a doctrine then still) a **critique of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure** insofar as it is not empirically grounded.

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Now the **faculty of cognition** in accordance with concepts has its *a priori* principles in the pure understanding (in its concept of nature), the **faculty of desire**, in pure reason (in its concept of freedom), and there remains among the properties of mind in general an intermediate faculty or receptivity, namely the **feeling of pleasure and displeasure**, just as there remains among the higher faculties of cognition an intermediate one, the power of judgment. What is more natural than to suspect that the latter will also contain *a priori* principles for the former?^c

Without yet deciding anything about the possibility of this connection, a certain suitability of the power of judgment to serve as the determining ground for the feeling of pleasure, or to find one in it, is already unmistakable, insofar as, while in the **division of faculties of cognition through concepts** understanding and reason relate their representations to objects, in order to acquire concepts of them, the power of judgment is related solely to the subject and does not produce any concepts of objects for itself alone. Likewise, if in the general **division of the powers of the mind** overall the faculty of cognition as well as the faculty of desire contain an **objective** relation of representations, so by contrast the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is only the receptivity of a determination of the subject,^d so that if the power of judgment is to determine anything for itself alone, it could not be

^a Crossed out by Kant: "As inner perceptions exhibit in so many cases."

^b Crossed out: "in inner observation."

^c Question mark added.

^d Kant substituted "of the subject" for the phrase "of the state of mind" (*Gemüthsstandes*) in the fair copy, and then added the remainder of the sentence.

anything other than the feeling of pleasure, and, conversely, if the latter is to have an *a priori* principle at all, it will be found only in the power of judgment.⁵

IV.

On experience
as a system for the power of judgment.

We have seen in the critique of pure reason^a that the whole of nature as the totality of all objects of experience constitutes a system in accordance with transcendental laws, namely those that the understanding itself gives *a priori* (for appearances, namely, insofar as they, combined in one consciousness, are to constitute experience). For that very reason, experience, in accordance with general as well as particular laws, insofar as it is considered objectively to be possible in general, must also constitute (in the idea) a system of possible empirical cognitions. For that is required by the unity of nature, in accordance with a principle of the thoroughgoing connection of everything contained in this totality of all appearances. To this extent experience in general in accordance with transcendental laws of the understanding is to be regarded as a system and not as a mere aggregate.

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But it does not follow from this that nature even in accordance with **empirical** laws is a system that **can be grasped**^b by the human faculty of cognition, and that the thoroughgoing systematic interconnection of its appearances in one experience, hence the latter itself as a system, is possible for human beings. For the multiplicity and diversity of empirical laws could be so great that it might be possible for us to connect perceptions to some extent^c in accordance with particular laws discovered on various occasions into one experience, but never to bring these empirical laws themselves to the unity of kinship under a common principle, if, namely, as is quite possible in itself (at least as far as the understanding can make out *a priori*), the multiplicity and diversity of these laws, along with the natural forms corresponding to them, being infinitely great, were to present to us a raw chaotic aggregate and not the least trace of a system, even though we must presuppose such a system in accordance with transcendental laws.

For **unity of nature in time and space** and unity of the experience possible for us are identical, since the former is a totality of mere appearances (kinds of representations), which can have its objective

^a Presumably this means the book, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but the words are not underlined in the fair copy.

^b *fäßliches*

^c *theilweise*