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Christine M. Korsgaard

Morality as Freedom

Elevating though man's privilege is, of being capable of such an idea as freedom of choice — [those who are accustomed only to physiological explanations] are stirred up by the proud claims of speculative reason, which feels its power so strongly in other fields. They are stirred up just as if they were allies, leagued in defense of the omnipotence of theoretical reason and roused by a general call to arms to resist the idea of freedom of choice and thus at present, and perhaps for a long time to come (though ultimately in vain), to attack the moral concept of freedom and, if possible, render it suspect.

Immanuel Kant (TL 6: 378/34-35)

Kantian ethical philosophy has often been criticized for its dependence on an untenable conception of the freedom of the will. Kant is supposed to have asserted that we are morally responsible for all of our actions because we have free will, and that we have free will because we exist in a noumenal world in which we are uninfluenced by the temptations of desire and inclination. If we existed *only* in the noumenal world, we would invariably act as the categorical imperative requires, but because we are also phenomenal beings we sometimes go wrong. The view so understood gives rise to several problems. First, the claim that purely noumenal persons would act as the categorical imperative requires may be questioned. It is not obvious why persons uninfluenced by causality should act morally rather than any other way. Secondly, if it *can* be established that insofar as we are noumena we obey the moral law, then the account of moral imputability becomes unintelligible. If we are only responsible because we are noumena and if insofar as we are noumena we only do what is right, then we cannot be responsible for our evil actions. Or, if we are responsible, it is so radically that no room is left for excuses. For how can we take into account the terrible temptations to which the wrongdoer was subjected, when the choosing noumenon was uninfluenced by those temptations? Finally, the view seems to require an unappealing ontological commit-

I would like to thank Manley Thompson, Andrews Reath, Stephen Engstrom, and Onora O'Neill for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

ment to the existence of “two worlds,” and to give rise to a variety of puzzles about how what occurs in the one can influence the other.

In this paper my aim is to address these problems. In the first part of the paper, I show why Kant thinks that the moral law is the law of a free will, and why he thinks we must regard ourselves as free. I then argue that the supposed problems about responsibility and ontology arise from a common source: a failure to appreciate the radical nature of Kant’s separation of theoretical and practical reason, and of their respective domains of explanation and deliberation. When these domains are separated in the way that Kant’s philosophy requires, the problems about responsibility disappear, and we see that Kant’s theory of freedom does not commit him to an ontological dualism.¹ In the second part of the paper I show what it does commit him to: a certain conception of the moral virtues.

I. Law as Freedom

1. Freedom enters Kant’s moral philosophy as the solution to a problem. The categorical imperative is not analytic, and disregarding its claims is therefore not inconsistent. Yet it is supposed to present us with a rational necessity. In order to show that morality is not a “mere phantom of the mind” (G 4: 445/64), Kant seeks to provide a deduction of (or a credential for)² the moral law: he must link being rational to acting on the moral law. The third idea through which rationality and morality are linked is the positive conception of freedom. By showing, first, that a free person as such follows the moral law, and, second, that a rational person has grounds for regarding herself as free, Kant tries to show that insofar as we are rational, we will obey the moral law.

It was making the second of these two connections that troubled Kant — the connection between rationality and freedom. The arguments intended to demonstrate this connection in the *Foundations* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason* are obscure and appear to be different from one another. In *Foundations* III, Kant calls his argument a “deduction” of the moral law

¹ For another treatment of some of these same difficulties, but centered more on Kant’s views in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, see Henry E. Allison, “Empirical and Intelligible Character in the *Critique of Pure Reason*” in this volume.

² The alternative language is used because of the difference in Kant’s own two accounts of what he is doing. I discuss this below. (All citations from the *Foundations* are taken from Beck’s translation.)

(4: 454/73), and connects freedom and reason through the capacity of reason for pure spontaneous activity which is exhibited in its production of ideas. This spontaneous activity shows we are members of the intelligible world and therefore free (4: 452/70-71). In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, we are instead offered what Kant calls a "credential" for morality (5: 48/49) and told that "the objective reality of the moral law can be proved through no deduction" (5: 47/48). The credential is provided by the fact that freedom can be deduced *from* morality. Kant does not comment on the difference between these two arguments, and his readers do not agree about whether they come to the same thing, or are different arguments serving different purposes, or are incompatible arguments resulting from a change of mind.³

But Kant was not in doubt about his success in making the first connection, between morality and freedom. Kant was confident that "if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality together with its principle follows from it by the mere analysis of its concept" (G 4:447/65). In *Foundations* III, the argument for this point takes about a page; in the second *Critique*, it is a mere paragraph, posed as

Problem II

Granted that a will is free, find the law which alone is competent to determine it necessarily.

Since the material of the practical law, i.e., an object of the maxim, cannot be given except empirically, and since a free will must be independent of all empirical conditions (i.e., those belonging to the world of sense) and yet be determinable, a free will must find its ground of determination in the law, but independently of the material of the law. But besides the latter there is nothing in a law except the legislative form. Therefore, the legislative form, in so far as it is contained in the maxim, is the only thing which can constitute a determining ground of the [free] will. (5: 29/28-29)

Not everyone has found this connection so perspicuous. In his well-known appendix to *The Methods of Ethics*,⁴ Sidgwick complains that Kant's whole moral philosophy is vitiated by a confusion between two senses of "freedom."

³ For some important discussions of this question see the following works: H.J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative* (1947), Book IV (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971); W.D. Ross, *Kant's Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954); Karl Ameriks, "Kant's Deduction of Freedom and Morality," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 19 (1981): 53-80; Dieter Henrich, "Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes," in *Denken im Schatten des Nihilismus*, ed. Alexander Schwan (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975). My own view on the matter is explained in Section 3.

⁴ Repr. Indianapolis: Hackett 1981. The appendix, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will [Reprinted with some omissions, from *Mind*, 1888, Vol. 13, no. 51]" was first attached to the sixth edition in 1901.

“Moral or neutral” freedom is the freedom we exercise when we choose between good and evil. “Good or rational” freedom is the freedom we exercise when we act morally, and so are not “enslaved” by our passions and desires. Sidgwick accuses Kant of being unaware of the distinction. This accusation is unfair, for the distinction Sidgwick makes is closely related to Kant’s own distinction between the negative and positive freedom. As we shall see, Kant rejects moral or neutral freedom as a conception of freedom; but it is a consequence of negative freedom, or the absence of all determination.

We may put Kant’s reply to Sidgwick in these terms. Following John Rawls, we may distinguish the *concept* of X, formally or functionally defined, from a *conception* of X, materially and substantively defined.⁵ The Kantian *concept* of free will would be “a will which makes choices independently of all alien influences,” that is, a will which is negatively free. A positive *conception* of freedom would be a material account of what such a will would in fact choose. Kant’s reply to Sidgwick will then be that there is a single concept of freedom, of which the moral law is the unique positive conception. My aim in the next section is to explain Kant’s claim that the moral law is the unique positive conception of freedom.

2. Kant argues that when you make a choice you must act “under the idea of freedom” (G 4:448/66). He explains that “we cannot conceive of a reason which consciously responds to a bidding from the outside with respect to its judgments” (G 4:448/66). You may of course *choose* to act on a desire, but insofar as you take the act to be *yours*, you think you have made it your maxim to act on this desire. If you feel that the desire impelled you into the act, you do not regard the act as a product of your will, but as involuntary. The point is not that you must *believe* that you are free, but that you must choose as if you were free. It is important to see that this is quite consistent with believing yourself to be fully determined. To make it vivid, imagine that you are participating in a scientific experiment, and you know that today your every move is programmed by an electronic device implanted in your brain. The device is not going to bypass your thought processes, however, and make you

⁵ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard, 1971), p. 5. Rawls is in turn drawing upon H.L. H. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 155-59. Rawls uses the distinction in separating the concept of justice, “a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining... the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation” from conceptions of justice, that is, various substantive accounts of what those principles are.

move mechanically, but rather to work through them: it will determine what you think. Perhaps you get up and decide to spend the morning working. You no sooner make the decision than it occurs to you that it must have been programmed. We may imagine that in a spirit of rebellion you then decide to skip work and go shopping. And then it occurs to you that *that* must have been programmed. The important point here is that efforts to second guess the device cannot help you decide what to do. They can only prevent you from making any decision. In order to *do* anything, you must simply ignore the fact that you are programmed, and decide what to do — just as if you were free. You will believe that your decision is a sham, but it makes no difference.⁶ Kant's point, then, is not about a theoretical assumption necessary to decision, but about a fundamental feature of the standpoint from which decisions are made.⁷ It follows from this feature that we must regard our decisions as springing ultimately from principles that we have chosen, and justifiable by those principles. We must regard ourselves as having free will.

Kant defines a free will as a rational causality that is effective without being determined by an alien cause. Anything outside of the will counts as an alien cause, including the desires and inclinations of the person. The free will must be entirely self-determining. Yet, because it is a causality, it must act on some law or other. "Since the concept of a causality entails that of laws... it follows that freedom is by no means lawless" (G 4:446/65). The free will therefore must have its own law. Alternatively, we may say that since the will is practical reason, it cannot be conceived as acting and choosing for no reason. Since reasons are derived from principles, the free will must have its own principle. Kant thinks that the categorical imperative is the free will's law or principle. But it may seem unclear why this more than anything else should be the free will's principle. If it is free to make its own law, why can't it make any law whatever?

To see why, imagine an attempt to discover the freely adopted principle on which some action is based. I ask to know why you are doing some ordinary thing, and you give me your proximate reason, your immediate end. I then ask why you want that, and most likely you mention some larger end or project. I

⁶ You may take the belief into account in other ways, like other beliefs. For instance, you may decide to warn your friends that you may do something uncharacteristic today, and that if so they should not be upset, since you are, as we say, "not yourself."

⁷ This is brought out well by Thomas Hill, Jr., in "Kant's Argument for the Rationality of Moral Conduct," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 66 (1985): 3-23 and in "Kant's Theory of Practical Reason" delivered at the conference *Ethics and Its History*, May 16-17, 1986, at the University of California at San Diego.

can press on, demanding your reason at every step, until we reach the moment when you are out of answers. You have shown that your action is calculated to assist you in achieving what you think is desirable on the whole, what you have determined that you want most.

The reasons that you have given can be cast in the form of maxims derived from imperatives. From a string of hypothetical imperatives, technical and pragmatic (G 4:416-17/34), you have derived a maxim to which we can give the abbreviated formulation:

“I will do this action, in order to get what I desire.”

According to Kant, this maxim only determines your will if you have adopted another maxim that makes it your end to get what you desire. This maxim is:

“I will make it my end to have the things that I desire.”

Now suppose that I want to know why you have adopted this maxim. Why should you try to satisfy your desires?

There are two answers which we can dismiss immediately. First, suppose you appeal to a psychological law of nature that runs something like “a human being necessarily pursues the things he or she desires.”⁸ To appeal to this causal law as an answer would be to deny your freedom and to deny that you are acting under the idea of freedom. The answer does not have the structure of reason-giving: it is a way of saying “I can’t help it.” Second, suppose you claim that you have adopted this maxim randomly. There is nothing further to say. You think you could have adopted some other maxim, since you regard your will as free, but as it happened you picked this one. As we know, Kant rejects this, as being inconsistent with the very idea of a will, which does what it does according to a law, or for a reason. It seems as if the will must choose its principle for a reason and so always on the basis of some more ultimate principle.

We are here confronted with a deep problem of a familiar kind. If you can give a reason, you have derived it from some more fundamental maxim, and I can ask why you have adopted that one. If you cannot, it looks as if your principle was randomly selected. Obviously, to put an end to a regress like this we need a principle about which it is impossible, unnecessary, or incoherent to ask why a free person would have chosen it. Kant’s argument must show that

⁸ To understand this as a law of nature, rather than as a tautology, we must of course understand a “desire” not merely as something we ascribe to a person on the basis of her actions, but as a psychological phenomenon of some sort. This view of desire is also implied by Kant’s account of desire as an incentive, which I explain below.

the categorical imperative has this status.

Although Kant does not think that a free will exists in time, we may imagine that there is a "moment" when the free will is called upon to choose its most fundamental principle. In order to be a will, it must have a principle, from which it will derive its reasons. The principle it chooses will determine what it counts as a reason. But precisely because at this "moment" the will has not yet determined what it will count as a reason, it seems as if there could be no reason for it to choose one principle rather than another. Kant calls this feature of the will its "spontaneity."⁹

As the argument stands now, it looks as if the will could adopt any maxim we can construct. If you have a free will you could adopt a maxim of pursuing only those things to which you have an aversion, or perhaps all and only the things your next-door neighbor enjoys. For us human beings, however, these are not serious options, for reasons that come out most clearly in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. Kant uses the term "incentive" (*Triebfeder*) to describe the relation of the free person to the candidate reasons among which she chooses. An incentive is something that makes an action interesting to you, that makes it a live option. Desires and inclinations are incentives; so is respect for the moral law. An inclination by itself is *merely* an incentive, and does not become a reason for action until the person has adopted it freely into her maxim (Rel. 6: 23-24/19; 44/40). Although incentives do not yet provide reasons for the spontaneous will, they do determine what the options are — which things, so to speak, are candidates for reasons. And having an aversion to something is not, for us human beings, an incentive for pursuing it, and so will not become a reason. In the *Religion*, Kant claims that it is impossible for a human being not to be moved at all by incentives; our freedom, rather, is exercised in choosing the order of precedence among the different kinds of incentives to which we are subject (6: 30/25; 36/31). So the real choice will be between a maxim of self-love, which subordinates the incentives of morality to those of inclination, and the moral maxim, which subordinates incentives of inclination to moral ones. The maxim of self-love says something like:

"I will do what I desire, and what is morally required if it doesn't interfere with my self-love."

and the moral maxim says something like:

⁹ More specifically, Kant associates the will's spontaneity with the fact that it does not exist under temporal conditions and so is uninfluenced by causality, but the important point here is just being uninfluenced — by anything. I discuss the relation between freedom and time in section 6.

"I will do what is morally required, and what I desire if it doesn't interfere with my duty."

More specifically stated, of course, the moral maxim is the maxim derived from the categorical imperative:

"I will act only on a maxim that I can will as a universal law."

It looks at first as if the problem here is to show that there is some reason for the spontaneous will to choose the moral maxim rather than the maxim of self-love. Yet this seems impossible, since the spontaneous will by hypothesis has not yet determined what it counts as a reason. But on reflection we shall see that this problem can be circumvented. We need only consider the *stand-point* of the spontaneous will, and the *content* of the categorical imperative.

At the standpoint of spontaneity, the will must, in order so to speak to commence operations, choose a principle or a law for itself. Nothing provides any content for that law. *All that it has to be is a law.*

Suppose that it chooses the categorical imperative, as represented by the Formula of Universal Law. This formula merely tells us to choose a law. Its only constraint on our choice is that it have the form of a law. Nothing provides any content for that law. *All that it has to be is a law.*

By making the Formula of Universal Law its principle, the free will retains the position of spontaneity. Or, to put it a better way, the argument shows that the free will need do nothing to make the Formula of Universal Law its principle: it is already its principle. The categorical imperative is thus shown to be the law of spontaneity. In a sense, the Formula of Universal Law simply describes the function or task of an autonomous will. The moral law does not impose a constraint on the will; it merely says what it has to do in order to be an autonomous will at all. It has to choose a law.

On the other hand, suppose the will chooses the maxim of self-love. In that case, it departs from its position of spontaneity and puts itself in the service of inclination. A constraint on its choice is acquired. The important thing to see is that there is no incentive for the spontaneous will to do this. Since we are just talking about the will itself right now, and not the whole person, the incentives of inclination cannot provide a temptation to adopt the maxim of self-love. Incentives of inclination cannot move the will to abandon its position of spontaneity, since they cannot move the will at all until it has already abandoned that position by resolving to be moved by them.

This argument, which I will call the Argument from Spontaneity, shows that there are not really two choices, morality and self-love, on an equal footing. The will that makes the categorical imperative its law merely

reaffirms its independence of everything except law in general. Its dependence on law in general is not a constraint, for that is just a consequence of the fact that it is a will. Making the categorical imperative its principle does not require the spontaneous will to take an action — it is already its principle. Adopting the maxim of self-love is surrendering the position of spontaneity, and does require an action (Rel. 6: 31-32/26-27). And it is an action for which there could be no reason. Thus, not only are the two options not on a footing, but the choice of the maxim of self-love over that of morality is unintelligible. Morality is the natural condition of a free will. The free will that puts inclination above morality sacrifices its freedom for nothing.

3. A crucial point in the Argument from Spontaneity is that the spontaneous will is not tempted by incentives of inclination. Now, we human beings are not so situated with respect to the incentives of inclination, because we are imperfectly rational beings. Or rather, this is what makes us imperfectly rational beings. Our inclinations may be alien to our purely rational wills, but they are not alien to us, and they do tempt us. Letting our wills serve our happiness therefore does not seem pointless to us. So although the Argument from Spontaneity explains why a purely rational will would have the moral law as its first principle, it does not show us exactly why we should do so. In Kant's language, it does not explain "the interest attaching to the ideas of morality" (G 4:448/66).

Without an account of moral interest, Kant complains, there will be a circle in our explanation of moral obligation (G 4:449-50/67-69). Now, what exactly this circle is is rather difficult to see. Kant has already claimed that, as creatures who must act under the idea of freedom, we are bound by the laws of freedom (G 4:448/66). But he thinks this does not yet explain how "the worth we ascribe" to moral actions (G 4:449/68) can so completely outweigh the worth of our condition — that is, our happiness or unhappiness. We are willing to grant the importance of the autonomy we express in moral conduct only because we already think that morality is supremely important. But it is still unclear why we think so. What is needed is an incentive for us to identify with the free and rational side of our nature. To provide this, Kant introduces the distinction between the intelligible and sensible worlds, or noumena and phenomena.¹⁰ This distinction introduces two new elements into the argument.

¹⁰ "World" (*Welt*) is Kant's term, and it is in some respects unfortunate, since it has lent credence to the interpretation of the distinction as an ontological dualism. Actually these two worlds are two standpoints, or ways we have of looking at things; as

The first element is the emphasis on complete causal determination in the phenomenal world. Up until now, I have spoken of the will that adopts the maxim of self-love as adopting an unnecessary constraint. But the addition of the two-worlds picture makes the consequence of adopting the maxim of self-love look even worse. The will that adopts self-love as its maxim is determined by inclinations, and inclinations, in the world of phenomena, are completely determined by natural forces, by the nexus of causal laws. So such a will becomes a mere conduit for natural forces. The person who acts from self-love is in a sense not actively willing at all, but simply allowing herself to be controlled by the passive part of her nature, which in turn is controlled by all of nature. From the perspective of the noumenal world, ends we adopt under the influence of inclination rather than morality do not even seem to be our own.

The other element is introduced with the claim that "*the intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world and hence of its laws*" (G 4:453/72).¹¹ Although we can *know* nothing of the noumenal world, it is what we conceive as lying behind the phenomenal world and giving that world its character. To conceive yourself as a member of the noumenal world is therefore to conceive yourself as among the grounds of the world as we know it.¹² And if you hold this position in so far as you have a will, then that means that the actions of your will make a real difference to the way the phenomenal world is.

Combining these two new elements we can generate a very stark contrast between choosing the maxim of morality and choosing that of self-love. We can think of the noumenal world as containing our own wills and whatever else forms part of "the ground of the sensible world and its laws." In particular, the noumenal world contains the ground, whatever it might be, of the laws of nature (for these are not objects of our wills).¹³ We can influence

I will argue in the next section, they represent a practical and a theoretical viewpoint. I have continued to use the terminology of two worlds, since it is convenient and suits Kant's own usage. I would like to thank Onora O'Neill for urging me to be clearer on this point.

¹¹ The remark is not italicized in Beck's translation, although it is in the Akademie Textausgabe and the Paton and Abbott translations.

¹² For a different reading than mine of the idea that the intelligible world contains the grounds of the sensible world and its laws, and of why we must conceive ourselves as among those grounds, see Onora O'Neill's "Agency and Anthropology in Kant's *Groundwork*" in this volume.

¹³ That our noumenal choices are in some way the ground of the laws of nature is a possibility that remains open; it is enough for the argument that we do not conceive ourselves as choosing these laws.

the phenomenal world, and these other forces do so as well. Of course, nothing can be known about the nature of this influence or its mechanisms, or of how these various agencies together generate the world of appearances. But we can still say this: if by choosing the maxim of self-love you allow the laws of nature to determine your actions, then you are in effect surrendering your place among "the grounds of the sensible world and its laws." The existence of your will in the noumenal world makes no difference to the character of the phenomenal world. For your will is determined by the laws of nature, and those in turn can be accounted for by other forces in the noumenal world. Although you are free, you could just as well not have been. Your freedom makes no difference. But if you will in accordance with the moral law, you do make a difference. You actually contribute — we might say to the rational, as opposed to the merely natural, ordering of the sensible world. The choice of the moral maxim over the maxim of self-love may then be seen as a choice of genuine activity over passivity; a choice to use your active powers to make a difference in the world.

Recall that all of this is supposed to solve the problem of moral interest. Kant thinks of the idea of our intelligible existence as being, roughly speaking, the motivating thought of morality, and so what makes morality possible. In the *Religion*, Kant tells us that one who honors the moral law cannot avoid thinking about what sort of world he would create under the guidance of practical reason, and that the answer is determined by the moral idea of the Highest Good (6: 5/5). In the second *Critique*, Kant says in one place that our intelligible existence gives us a "higher vocation" (5: 98/91). This vocation is help to make the world a rational place, by contributing to the production of the Highest Good.¹⁴

This argument also explains why Kant thinks that unless the Highest Good is possible the moral law is "fantastic, directed to empty imaginary ends, and consequently inherently false" (KpV 5:114/118). The difficulty arises in this way. We have explained moral interest in terms of a stark contrast between being a mere conduit for natural forces on the one hand and making a real difference in the world through one's intentions on the other. But in between these two possibilities we discover a third — that our intentions and actions will make a real difference in the world, but that we will have no control over what sort of difference they make — because the consequences of our actions

¹⁴ In a footnote in "On the Common Saying: 'This may be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'" Kant speaks directly of the moral incentive as provided by the idea of the highest possible earthly good, as "attainable through his [man's] collaboration [*Mitwirkung*]" (TP 8: 280n/65n).

will not be what we intend. This can happen because we are not the only elements of the noumenal world and the various forces it contains combine, in ways we cannot comprehend, to generate the world of appearances. The forces of nature and the actions of other persons mediate between our intentions and the actual results of our actions, often distorting or perverting those results. This possibility then makes the appeal of freedom seem like a fraud. If the motivating thought of morality is that freedom means that we can make a difference in the world, but we then find that we have no control over the form this difference ultimately takes, then the motivating thought is genuinely threatened. Postulating God as the author of the laws of nature is a way of guaranteeing that other noumenal forces will cooperate with our good intentions, and leaves our moral interest in place. In the *Foundations*, Kant says:

the idea of a pure intelligible world as a whole of all intelligences to which we ourselves belong as rational beings... is always a useful and permissible idea for the purpose of a rational faith. This is so even though all knowledge terminates at its boundary, for through the glorious idea of a universal realm of end-in-themselves (rational beings) a lively interest in the moral law can be awakened in us. (4: 462/82)

The Two-Worlds Argument is worked out better in the *Critique of Practical Reason* than in *Foundations* III. In *Foundations* III, Kant wants to argue that the idea of our existence in the intelligible world suggests our freedom to us: our capacity for pure spontaneous activity, which reveals itself in reason's production of ideas, makes us members of the intelligible world. As such we may regard ourselves as free. In the second *Critique*, Kant develops the reverse argument that freedom leads us to the conception of our existence in the intelligible world. It is morality, in turn, that teaches us that we are free. So morality itself "points" us to the intelligible world (KpV 5:44/43). The argument of the *Critique of Practical Reason* is superior because freedom requires not just that we exist in the intelligible world, but that we exist there insofar as we have wills — that we can be motivated from there, so to speak. The *Foundations* argument places our theoretical capacity to formulate pure ideas in the intelligible world, but that by itself does not imply that we can be moved by them.¹⁵ And the latter is what the argument must show. The second *Critique* argument starts firmly from the fact that we can be motivated by pure ideas. That we can be so motivated is what Kant calls the Fact of Reason.

¹⁵ For a different and perhaps more sympathetic account of the argument of *Foundations* III, see Onora O'Neill, "Agency and Anthropology in Kant's *Groundwork*" in this volume, especially section 6.

But the function of the idea of our intelligible existence as an incentive is essentially the same in both books. The famous address to Duty in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, like *Foundations* III, demands to know the source of the special worth we assign to morality (5:86-87/98). And the answer is again that respect for the moral law is produced by the thought of our intelligible nature. Kant says that the incentive of pure practical reason is nothing else than the pure moral law itself, so far as it lets us perceive the sublimity of our own supersensuous existence. (KpV 5:89/91)¹⁶

The Argument from Spontaneity shows why a free and spontaneous will, uninfluenced by anything, makes the moral law its principle. The Argument from the Two Worlds shows us why we imperfectly rational beings, influenced by sensibility as well as morality, should do so as well. If we are free we are members of the intelligible world, the ground of the sensible world and its laws. This gives us a "higher vocation" than the satisfaction of our own desires. We can help to bring about the Highest Good in the world. The thought of that higher vocation is the motive of morality.

4. But the result of the Argument from Spontaneity may seem too strong. If the will *is* free, moral evil is unintelligible, for if this argument is correct, moral evil is the pure will's wholly unmotivated abandonment of its freedom. However, this is exactly Kant's view: evil is unintelligible. Neither a good will nor an evil will admits of explanation, for both must be regarded as grounded in the person's own free and spontaneous choice. If these choices could be explained, they would be derived from something else, and then they would not be the spontaneous choices that they purport to be (Rel. 6:21/17). Yet it is evil that is unintelligible, for it is in the evil choice that the will falls away from its freedom. Kant says:

Evil could have sprung only from the morally-evil (not from mere limitations in our nature); and yet the original predisposition is a predisposition to good; there is then for us no conceivable ground from which the moral evil in us could originally have come. (Rel. 6:43/38)

Moral evil is a Fall, in the Biblical sense, and it is exactly as hard to understand as the Fall in the Bible (Rel. 6:19/15; 41ff/36ff).

¹⁶ The view that the idea of the intelligible world plays a motivational role can also be supported by appeal to Kant's writings on moral education, especially in the Methodologies of the second *Critique* and *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue* (my references here are to the Ellington translation). In both, there is an emphasis on awakening the child to the sublimity of the intelligible existence which freedom reveals.

In fact, Kant goes so far as to deny that what Sidgwick calls moral or neutral freedom, the freedom to choose between good and evil, is really a conception of freedom at all:

freedom can never be located in the fact that the rational subject is able to make a choice in opposition to his (legislative) reason, even though experience proves often enough that this does happen (though we cannot comprehend how this is possible)... Only freedom in relation to the internal legislation of reason is properly a capacity; the possibility of deviating from it is an incapacity. (MS 6:226-27/26-27)

Many readers, among them Sidgwick,¹⁷ have complained that so strong an identification of freedom and morality should force Kant to give up his account of moral imputability. If the moral law is the unique positive conception of freedom, then it seems as if only morally good actions are really free. Kant does say that if we were solely members of the intelligible world we would always act in accordance with the moral law. How then are we to account for the imputability of bad actions and characters? Your noumenal self would not have chosen them. Your phenomenal self, being wholly determined, cannot be held responsible.

But these complaints ignore the status of the positive conception of freedom, and its corollary, intelligible existence, in the Kantian system. The positive conception of freedom, understood as noumenal causality, is a postulate of practical reason, in the sense developed in the *Dialectic* of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Kant explains the basis of such postulates this way:

The postulates of pure practical reason all proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a postulate but a law by which reason directly determines the will. This will... requires these necessary conditions for obedience to its precept. These postulates are not theoretical dogmas but presuppositions of necessarily practical import; thus, while they do not extend speculative knowledge, they give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their relation to the practical sphere), and they justify it in holding to concepts even the possibility of which it could not otherwise venture to affirm.

These postulates are those of immortality, of freedom affirmatively regarded (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the intelligible world), and of the existence of God. (5:132/137)

A postulate of practical reason is an object of rational belief, but the reasons for the belief are practical and moral. The person needs the belief as a condition for obedience to the moral law, and it is this, combined with the categorical nature of that law, that justifies the belief. Although the beliefs are

¹⁷ *The Methods of Ethics*, p. 516.

theoretical in form — the will is free, there is a God — their basis and their function are practical. As Kant says in the passage quoted above, and as he constantly emphasizes in the second *Critique*, the postulates play no theoretical or explanatory role whatsoever. They provide us with concepts that define the intelligible world, but we have no intuitions to which we may apply those concepts, and consequently no theoretical knowledge of their objects (e.g. 5:54-56/55-57; 133/138; 136/141).

The fact that the postulates of practical reason play no theoretical role has two important implications. One is that we cannot conclude from the Argument from Spontaneity that evil is impossible, or that a person who does something evil has not done it freely. A free but evil will is shown to be unintelligible *from the standpoint of pure practical reason*, but not to be theoretically impossible. It cannot be explained, but no act of freedom can be explained. And we are whole persons, not just pure spontaneous wills. Unlike the pure will in the Argument from Spontaneity, we are imperfectly rational, because we *are* subject to temptation from inclinations. There is no problem about explaining how *we* go wrong.

A central feature of Kant's philosophy as a whole is brought out here. The deliberating agent, employing reason practically, views the world as it were from a noumenal standpoint, as an expression of the wills of God and other rational agents. This is the philosophical consequence of the fact that we act under the idea of freedom, and of the way in which freedom leads to the other practical postulates: the ethical world replaces the world of speculative metaphysics. Kant tells us that "a moral principle is nothing but a dimly conceived metaphysics, which is inherent in every man's rational constitution" (TL 6:376/32). The theorizing spectator, on the other hand, views the world as phenomena, mechanistic and fully determined. The interests of morality demand a different conceptual organization of the world than those of theoretical explanation (MS 6:217/17; 221/20; 225/25). Both interests are rational and legitimate. And it is important that neither standpoint is privileged over the other — each has its own territory. Or, if either is privileged, it is the practical, because, according to Kant, "every interest is ultimately practical" (KpV 5:121/126).¹⁸ From the explanatory standpoint of theoretical reason, nothing is easier to understand than that a human being might evade duty when it is in conflict with her heart's desire. From the normative standpoint of practical reason her sacrifice of her freedom for some mere object of inclination is completely unintelligible. These two standpoints give

¹⁸ The metaphysical conception of the world also provides the regulative principles used in the theoretical sphere — but what those do is regulate the *practice* of science.

us two very different views of the world. To suppose that the Argument from Spontaneity shows anything at all about what can *happen* is to mix the theoretical and explanatory standpoint with the practical and normative one in an illegitimate way.

The second implication follows from the first. The standpoint from which you adopt the belief in freedom is that of the deliberating agent. You are licensed to believe in the practical postulates because they are necessary conditions of obeying the moral law. Thus it is primarily your own freedom that you are licensed to believe in, and, as a consequence, it is primarily yourself that you hold imputable. The result is that the business of praising and blaming others occupies a somewhat unstable position in Kantian ethics. It is true that you are supposed to regard others as free, and to treat them accordingly. But the necessity of doing so comes from the moral law, which commands the attribution of freedom to persons, and not from theoretical reasoning about how their wills actually function.¹⁹ The moral sentiments of approval and disapproval, praise and blame, are, when directed to others, governed by the duties associated with the virtues of love and respect. And these duties, as Kant understands them, may actually demand attitudes of us that exclude or curtail theoretical reasoning about the motives of others. To the extent that we respect others and regard them as free, we must admit that we do not know the ultimate ground of their motives. And not knowing it, we are obligated wherever possible to take a generous attitude. Even when dealing with an actual wrongdoer, Kant says we must

not deny the wrongdoer all moral worth, because on that hypothesis he could never be improved either — and this latter is incompatible with the idea of man, who as such (as a moral being) can never lose all predisposition to good. (TL 6:463-64/128-29)²⁰

And Kant urges us to “cast the veil of philanthropy over the faults of others, not merely by softening but also by silencing our judgments” (TL 6:466/132).²¹

¹⁹ In Kantian ethics moral concepts are ideals of practical reason that are imposed on the world, by the command of the moral law, and for practical and moral purposes only. When we praise and blame we are, so to speak, applying the concept of “freedom” to another. The moral law both commands and regulates the application of this concept. I discuss this way of regarding moral concepts in “Two Arguments against Lying,” *Argumentation* 2 (1988): 27-49.

²⁰ I give a fuller explanation of the attitude Kant thinks is required and the moral basis for it in my “The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 15 (1986): 325-349.

²¹ In these respects Kant’s views stand in sharp contrast to the British Sentimentalists whom he admired: Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith. All developed their ethical

The positive conception of freedom, then, is not to be given a theoretical employment. The idea of positive freedom is not supposed to show that moral evil is so irrational that it is impossible. Indeed, Kant does not propose that we should explain actions theoretically by referring them to the free choice of maxims in an intelligible world. The role of the idea of freedom and the intelligible world is, rather, a practical one. It provides a conception of ourselves which motivates us to obey the moral law.

In Kant's philosophy, freedom of the will *cannot* be theoretically established. To establish it would be to achieve knowledge of the noumenal world, and this is something that we cannot have. The freedom of the will is asserted, but as a practical postulate, and so only from a practical point of view. But surely, one is tempted to say, it cannot simply *fail to matter* to the moral agent who is to be motivated by this conception whether she is in point of actual fact free or mechanistically determined.

In one sense Kant's response to this worry is contained in the idea of the Fact of Reason. The Fact of Reason is our consciousness of the moral law as a determining ground of the will (KpV 5:31/31). Kant says: "We can come to know pure practical principles in the same way we know pure theoretical principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us and to the elimination from them of all empirical conditions, which reason directs" (KpV 5:30/29). The moral law is thus presented to us by reason "as soon as we construct maxims for the will" (KpV 5:29/29) and it reveals our freedom to us. It does this by showing us that we are able to act against even our strongest inclinations, because there are cases in which we ought to. Kant says that a person considering such a case:

judges... that he can do something because he knows that he ought, and he recognizes that he is free — a fact that, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him. (KpV 5:30/30)

Putting this together with the argument from the *Foundations* about acting under the idea of freedom, we arrive at an account of the possibility of morality with a rather complicated structure. (i) We must act under the idea of (at least negative) freedom; (ii) we must therefore act on maxims we regard

theories from the point of view of the spectator of the moral conduct of others, and took approbation and disapprobation as the central concepts of ethics, from which the other concepts of moral thought are developed. Hutcheson and Hume believe that the best moral agent is not thinking about morality at all, but acting from admirable natural affections. Smith comes closer to an agent-centered theory, for he takes the agent to act from specifically moral thoughts, but they are generated from an *internal spectator*.

ourselves as having chosen; (iii) by the Argument from Spontaneity (or, as Kant puts it here, by eliminating all empirical conditions, as reason directs) we are led to the moral law (the positive conception of freedom); (iv) our ability to act on the moral law teaches us that we *are* (negatively) free; (v) if so, we are members of the intelligible world, and have a higher vocation than the satisfaction of our desires, and (vi) this provides us with the incentive to be positively free — that is, moral.

But all of this still remains at the level of the practical postulate. For the sense in which our ability to act on the moral law teaches us that we are free (step iv) and so are members of an intelligible world (step v) is that we must believe these things in order to obey the categorical imperative. And articles of belief we hold because they are necessary conditions of obedience to the moral law are practical postulates, with no theoretical employment.

And, in a sense, Kant's answer to the question whether it matters if we are in fact (theoretically) free *is* that it does not matter. Kant's deduction of freedom from the moral law in the *Critique of Practical Reason* concludes:

Thus reason, which with its ideas always became transcendent when proceeding in a speculative manner, can be given for the first time an objective, *although still only practical*, reality; its transcendent use is changed into an immanent use, whereby reason becomes, in the field of experience, an efficient cause through ideas. (5: 48/49; my emphasis)

Reason becomes an efficient cause by telling us how a free person would act and by providing the conception of our higher vocation that motivates us to act that way. For if the moral law does indeed provide the positive conception of freedom, then we know how a person with a completely free will would act. Motivated by the idea of the higher vocation freedom gives us, we can act that way ourselves. But if we are able to act exactly as we would if we were free, under the influence of the idea of freedom, then we are free. Nothing is missing: the will in the Argument from Spontaneity, when making its original choice of a principle, could not do more. It chooses to act on the moral law for the sake of maintaining its freedom; and we can do the same. *By acting morally, we can make ourselves free.*

II. Virtue as Freedom

5. At this point a natural objection arises. The proposed solution to the free will problem depends on our being able to act according to the moral law for the sake of our freedom. I have claimed that what interests us in our freedom is the higher vocation of contributing to the Highest Good. But if this interest

determines our moral actions, how can we be free? To answer this question, we must turn to Kant's theory of virtue, or "internal freedom."

It is Kant's view that all human action is purposive. A human being always acts for the sake of an end. Kant speaks of this as being the result of our finite and sensible nature. In a footnote in *Religion I* Kant says:

All men could have sufficient incentive if (as they should) they adhered solely to the dictation of pure reason in the law. What need have they to know the outcome of their moral actions and abstentions...? Yet it is one of the inescapable limitations of man and of his faculty of practical reason (a limitation, perhaps, of all other worldly beings as well) to have regard, in every action, to the consequence thereof — which consequence, though last in practice... is yet first in representation and intention.... In this end, if directly presented to him by reason alone, man seeks something that he can love; therefore the law, which merely arouses his respect, even though it does not acknowledge this object of love as a necessity, does yet extend itself on its behalf by including the moral goal of reason among its determining grounds. (6: 6-7n/6-7n)

The objective necessity in the law ought to motivate us directly, but a human being always acts for the sake of an end. This is why, in the *Foundations*, it is *after* explaining the Formula of Universal Law that Kant embarks on the project of showing the possibility of reason determining conduct a priori, and launches into a discussion of ends (4: 427/45). The Formula of Universal Law explains the objective necessity of moral conduct, but it does not explain the subjective necessity: that is, it does not explain how pure reason secures "access to the human mind" (KpV 5: 151/155). Pure practical reason itself must gain access to us through ends. Thus it is necessary to introduce the Formula of Humanity, which directs that we make humanity, and other aims which may be derived from it, our ends. The *Religion* footnote continues:

This extension is possible because of the moral law's being taken in relation to the natural characteristic of man, that for all his actions he must conceive of an end over and above the law (a characteristic which makes man an object of experience). (6: 7n/7n)²²

Kant also says that it is because of our susceptibility to temptation that ethics extends to ends.

For since sensible inclinations may misdirect us to ends (the matter of choice) which may be contrary to duty, legislative reason cannot guard against their influence other than, in turn, by means of an opposing moral end, which therefore must be given a priori independently of inclination. (TL 6: 381/38)

²² The mysterious-sounding parenthetical phrase is "*welche Eigenschaft desselben ihn zum Gegenstande der Erfahrung macht.*" I take the point to be to equate sensibility and the need for an end.

This sounds like a different account of the need for ends, but I believe it is not. The same element in our nature — the passive, sensible, representational element that makes us require an end, is also what makes us susceptible to temptation.²³

What this implies is that for human beings, freedom must take the form of virtue: the adoption and pursuit of moral ends. Kant explains why, in *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, by setting up a problem (6: 388-89/47). Every action has an end, and choice is always determined by an end (G 4: 427/45; TL 6: 381/38, 384-85/43; Rel. 6: 4/4). So a maxim of action, or of the means to an end, is adopted freely only when you have adopted the maxim of holding that end. But the moral law only says that the maxim we adopt must have a certain form, not that we must have certain maxims. How can it be necessary to have certain maxims? The answer is that if there are ends that are duties, there will be maxims that it is a duty to have: maxims of actions that promote those ends. Since we must believe that we are morally obligated (that is, that there are maxims we ought to have), we must believe that there are such obligatory ends. For example, Kant says that the (external) duties of justice can be done from a moral motive and so done freely by one who makes the rights of humanity one's end (TL 6: 390/49). The possibility of internal freedom is secured by the "Supreme Principle of the Doctrine of Virtue" which runs "Act according to a maxim whose ends are such that there can be a universal law that everyone have these ends" (TL 6: 395/54). This principle is deduced from pure practical reason by the following argument:

For practical reason to be indifferent to ends, i.e., to take no interest in them, would be a contradiction; for then it would not determine the maxims of actions (and the actions always contain an end) and, consequently, would not be practical reason. Pure reason, however, cannot a priori command any ends unless it declares these ends to be at the same time duties; such duties are then called duties of virtue. (TL 6: 395/54-55)

In the introduction to *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, Kant says that the obligatory ends are one's own perfection and the happiness of others. But in fact, a number of different ends appear in this text and elsewhere in the ethical writings. One's own perfection includes moral perfection and so subsumes the whole of morality, as well as natural perfection, which involves the development of our physical and intellectual capacities. The duties of respect make the rational autonomy of others an end. Securing the rights of

²³ In the Introduction to the *Metaphysics of Morals*, the faculty of desire is "the capacity to be by means of one's representations the cause of the objects of these representations" and the capacity to act in accordance with representations is identified as "life." (6: 211/9)

humanity is an end (TL 6: 390/49). In the political writings, the development of republican forms of government is made a necessary end for sovereigns (RL 6: 340/112), and peace is an end for everyone (RL 6: 354-55/127-29). The Highest Good, the whole object of practical reason, is a necessary end, as we have already seen (KpV 5: 108-14/112-18; Rel. 6: 3-6/3-6). It is because there are various ends, Kant says, that there are various virtues, even though virtue is essentially one thing (TL 6: 395/54; 406/65). All of these ends are determined by the moral law and so are necessary ends (ends of reason); and all of them can be derived from the unconditional value of humanity. When we act for the sake of these ends, we act from the moral law, for it determines them. It is because the law determines ends that creatures like ourselves, who always act for ends, can be free.²⁴

6. But this may not seem to resolve the problem. Clearly it is not enough that we act for moral ends; we must also do so *because* they are moral ends. We must adopt the ends themselves freely, as ends determined by the moral law. But if we must be free in order to adopt moral ends, then adopting moral ends cannot be what makes us free.

The answer to this objection lies in the special nature of internal freedom. To explain the answer, we must take a detour through another problem about the adoption of moral ends. Kant argues that the duties of virtue are all of broad obligation; they do not require definite acts which may simply be discharged (TL 6: 390/48).²⁵ The duty to *advance* a moral end is one of broad

²⁴ It might seem to be a problem that the Highest Good is supposed to be conceived as a divine end. How can God have an end if that is a need of sensibility? Kant explains: "For while the divinity has no subjective need of any external object, it cannot be conceived as closed up within itself, but only as compelled by the very awareness of its own all-sufficiency to produce the highest good outside itself. In the case of the supreme being, this necessity (which corresponds to duty in man) can be envisaged by us only as a moral need" (TP 8: 280n/65n).

²⁵ The question of the relation between the two distinctions, perfect/imperfect, and broad/strict, is a very difficult one. These have sometimes been thought to be simply alternative terms for the same distinction, but Kant explicitly asserts that all duties of virtue are of broad obligation, while mentioning many that are perfect. He does not explain himself, and his own use of the terms does not provide clear guidance. Two important discussions of this problem are in Mary Gregor, *The Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant's Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), pp. 95-127, and in Onora (O'Neill) Nell, *Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 43-58. The main justification I have to offer for the way I use these terms in the text is that they enable me to make the explanation that follows.

obligation because it is an imperfect duty; the law does not say exactly what or how much we should do to advance the end. But what about the duty to *adopt* a moral end? Kant thinks that the adoption of an end is necessarily a free act, for he says:

Another may indeed force me to do something which is not my end (but is only the means to some other's end); but he cannot force me to make it my own end, for I can have no end except of my own making. (TL 6: 38-39/381-82)

Making something your end is a kind of internal action, and it is these internal actions that are commanded by the Supreme Principle of the Doctrine of Virtue. The duty to adopt these ends (and so also the duty not to act against them) is a perfect duty. The law does say exactly what we must do. So why does Kant count such duties as creating only broad obligations which may not be discharged?

One of the things we expect of a person who has an end is that she will notice facts that are associated with that end in a certain way, and things that bear on the promotion of the end will occur to her. This is a general point about ends, and does not apply only to moral ends. To see this, imagine that I claim that I am Charlotte's friend, and that I have her happiness as my end. But imagine also that it seldom or never occurs to me to do anything in particular to make Charlotte happy. When I see something in a shop window that suits her taste exactly, I do not think, "now that is something Charlotte would really like," and go in to purchase it. When I look at the calendar on what happens to be her birthday, it does not occur to me that it is her birthday, and I should telephone. When I hear of some catastrophe happening in her neighborhood, I do not wonder about the possible bearing of this event on her safety and comfort. These things just do not come to me. Under these circumstances, surely Charlotte would be entitled to complain that there is no real sense in which I have her happiness as my end.²⁶ It would not be pertinent for me to reply that I have no direct control over what occurs to me. To find certain features of the world salient is part of our notion of what it is to have an end. To have an end is to see the world in a certain way. But what determines

²⁶ In one sense I may still claim to have her happiness as my end. I may hold an end merely negatively, as something I will endeavor not to act against. The Formula of Humanity says that we must never use another merely as a means, and Kant says in the *Foundations* that humanity is conceived negatively, as "that which must never be acted against" (4: 437/56). But Kant makes it clear that *virtue* is going to require a more positive pursuit of the end. He says: "It is not enough that he is not authorized to use either himself or others merely as means (this latter including also the case of his being indifferent to others)" (TL 6: 395/54).

salience most directly lies in our sensory and representational capacities — and so in the passive part of our nature. To adopt an end is to perform an internal action. But it is also to undergo certain changes, changes in your representational capacities. It is to come to perceive the world in the way that having the end requires.

When the end is one that is suggested by natural inclination, we are already inclined to perceive the world in the relevant way. Indeed, that you are inclined to perceive the world that way is the form that the incentive takes. Our sensible nature here helps us out. But when the end is one prompted by reason this may not be the case. Here, you are imposing a change on your sensible nature, and your sensible nature may, and probably will, be recalcitrant. Although adopting an end is a volitional act, it is one that you can only do gradually and perhaps incompletely.

This is why the duty to adopt an end is of broad obligation. You cannot, just by making a resolution, acquire a virtue or recover from a vice. Or better still, we will say that you can, because you are free, but then we must say that only what happens in the future establishes whether you have really made the resolution or not. I do not mean that only the future will produce the evidence: I mean that only what you do in the future will enable us to correctly attribute a resolution to you. There is a kind of backwards determination in the construction of one's character. Whether you have made it your maxim to be more just, helpful, respectful, or honest depends on what you do in the future — on whether you make progress towards being the sort of person you have (presumably) resolved to be. Because the materials we have to work with in these cases are recalcitrant, it is in the progress, not in the success, that Kant places virtue (TL 6: 409/69). But the work must show up in progress. Suppose, for instance, that I am selfish, but resolve to be more attentive to the needs of others. As a selfish person I will also be self-absorbed, and fail to notice when others are in trouble and to be perceptive about what they need. At first, others may have to draw my attention to the cases where I can help. But if I continue indefinitely to *fail to notice* when others are in need and I can help, then I just did not resolve. On the other hand, if I do progress, I will count as having resolved, even if I am not consistently unselfish all of the time.

This is Kant's explicit view in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. According to Kant, we must think of our free actions and choices as being unconditioned by time. If they were conditioned by time they would be subject to causality and so not free (6: 40/35). Still, time is a condition of our thinking, and this means that for us, temporally unconditioned choice must be represented as choice that either is before or in a certain way follows from the events of our lives. For purposes of holding ourselves responsible, we

think of the free adoption of our most fundamental maxim as if it were before our phenomenal choices: the evil in us is present from birth, Kant says, as if it were innate (Rel. 6: 21-22/17; 41/38; see also KpV 5: 100/103). But if our maxims were innate, we could not change for the better, for our most fundamental reasons would be self-interested ones. So, for purposes of regarding ourselves as free to change, we see the free choice of our character as something to which the whole conduct of our life adds up. Kant explains:

duty demands nothing of us which we cannot do. There is no reconciliation possible here except by saying that man is under the necessity of, and is therefore capable of, a revolution in his cast of mind, but only of a gradual reform in his sensuous nature (which places obstacles in the way of the former). That is, if a man reverses, by a single unchangeable decision, that highest ground of his maxims whereby he was an evil man (and thus puts on the new man), he is, so far as his principle and cast of mind are concerned, a subject susceptible of goodness, but only in continuous labor and growth is he a good man. That is, he can hope... to find himself upon the good (though strait) path of continual *progress* from bad to better. For Him who penetrates to the intelligible ground of the heart (the ground of all maxims of the will [*Willkür*]) and for whom this unending progress is a unity, *i.e.*, for God, that amounts to his being actually a good man (pleasing to Him); and, thus viewed, this change can be regarded as a revolution. (Rel. 6: 47-48/43)²⁷

The appearance of freedom in the phenomenal world, then, is virtue — a constant struggle to love and respect the humanity in oneself and others, and to defeat the claims inclination tries to make against that humanity. So far from committing him to a mysterious dualism, Kant's theory of the atemporal nature of freedom permits him to harmonize freedom with a temporal account of the acquisition of virtue. One achieves virtue through a gradual habituation, and, as in Aristotle's ethics, the sign of success is gladness in its practice. In the *Religion*, Kant says:

²⁷ See also this passage from the *Religion*: "we may also think of this endless progress of our goodness towards conformity to the law, even if this progress is conceived in terms of actual deeds, or life-conduct, as being judged by Him who knows the heart, through a purely intellectual intuition, as a completed whole, because of the *disposition*, supersensible in its nature, from which this progress itself is derived" (6: 67-68/60-61); and from the *Critique of Practical Reason*: "Only endless progress from lower to higher stages of moral perfection is possible to a rational but finite being. The Infinite Being, to whom the temporal condition is nothing, sees in this series, which is for us without end, a whole conformable to the moral law" (5: 123/127). This is why Kant thinks that ethics leads to a view of the "immortality" of the soul, which gives us a prospect of an *endless* progress toward the better. Only an endless progress is adequate to the achievement of freedom, and to wiping out the original evil in our nature (Rel. 6: 72/66; KpV 5: 122-24/126-28).

This resolve, then, encouraged by good progress, must needs beget a joyous frame of mind, without which man is never certain of having really *attained a love* for the good, *i.e.*, of having incorporated it into his maxim. (Rel. 6: 21n/19n)

To the extent to which moral ends have really become our ends, we will take pleasure in the pursuit of them. Indeed we have all of the emotions appropriate to having an end. In the *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, Kant speaks of gratitude (TL 6: 454-56/119-21) and even sympathetic feeling (TL 6: 456-58/121-23) as being required. He is quick to qualify these remarks, for we have no direct control over our feelings. Yet it is his view that one who does adopt an end will normally come to have the feelings that are natural to a person who has this end. If the end were suggested by sensibility, we would already have had the feelings, but though the end is adopted on moral grounds we should still come to have them eventually.²⁸ When explaining the relation between inclination and morality in the duty of beneficence, for example, Kant says:

Beneficence is a duty. Whoever often exercises this and sees his beneficent purpose succeed comes at last really to love him whom he has benefited. When therefore it is said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," this does not mean you should directly (at first) love and through this love (subsequently) benefit him; but rather, "Do good to your neighbor," and this beneficence will produce in you the love of mankind (as readiness of inclination toward beneficence in general). (TL 6: 402/61)

Kant does not mean that we will come to act solely from the inclination, but rather that the inclination will be in harmony with reason and so will no longer be an impediment. As long as we do not act from inclination, but because the ends are dictated by the law, this is no detriment to our moral character. On the contrary, it shows that we have advanced toward the complete control over our sensuous nature that is implied by freedom.

So we do not exactly need to adopt moral ends freely in order to be free. If we come, over time, to act purely for the sake of moral ends, it will come to be true that we are, timelessly, free.

²⁸ This is not guaranteed. The *Foundations* contains a well-known discussion of the worth of a man who is helpful although "by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps because he is provided with special gifts of patience and fortitude" (4: 398/14-15), which shows that Kant thinks moral worth may be combined with a recalcitrant temperament. The discussion has unfortunately often been taken to suggest that Kant thinks moral worth *must* be combined with a recalcitrant temperament.

7. Kant's theory of the freedom of the will involves neither extravagant ontological claims nor the unyielding theory of responsibility which seems to follow from those claims.²⁹ These problems arise only from a misunderstanding of a fundamental feature of the Kantian philosophy — the radical split between the theoretical and practical points of view. The idea of intelligible causality is a practical conception, and our belief in it is an article of practical faith. It is not supposed to be theoretically employed, and it cannot be used to explain anything that happens. It is true that the positive conception of freedom makes practical freedom possible — but not because it explains how it is possible. It makes practical freedom possible because we can act on it.

Kant sees positive freedom as pointing to a higher vocation, the thought of which moves us to moral conduct, and explains how we can take an interest in such conduct. This interest leads us to adopt moral ends, and so to struggle against the temptations that beset us. If we reach the point where we are indeed moved wholly by ends determined by the law, we are in fact free — practically free. Nothing in this development requires any ontological claims, or requires that we be radically different sorts of creatures than the mundane rational animals we suppose ourselves to be. All that Kant needs is the conclusion that the moral law does indeed represent the positive conception of freedom. The idea of freedom motivates us to cultivate the virtues, and, in turn, virtue makes us free.

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²⁹ Kant's theory of free will is sometimes described as "compatibilist" because both freedom and determinism are affirmed. This description seems to me to be potentially misleading. Most compatibilists, I believe, want to assert both freedom and determinism (or, both responsibility and determinism) from the same point of view — a theoretical and explanatory point of view. Kant does not do this, and could not do it without something his view forbids — describing the relation between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds.

Nathan Rotenstreich

On the Formalism of Kant's Ethics

(1)

Kant himself described his system as formal idealism. He distinguished this type of idealism from material idealism — a philosophical position which “doubts or denies the existence of outer things in themselves” (A491n/B519n). This description does not afford us a clear insight into the meaning of formalism as it occurs in the ethical context, because of the difficulty inherent in the terms ‘form’ and ‘formalism’. This difficulty is due to an interesting transformation (i.e., the special use of the root ‘form’ in this context), whereby *forma* as the Latin equivalent of the Greek *morphē* does not connote essence but, rather, something which is external and thus a mere framework. Thus, according to Kant, when we speak of the forms of knowledge, we refer only to logical forms which are “the formal ground of the objects” (A93/B125). Form is a condition in the sense that only through it can appearances be present and thus empirically intuited or given. Even when we add the feature of condition to the framework, there remains a gap between that which belongs to the realm of form as condition, and that which is brought within the scope of awareness and is conditioned by the form. That is, the fact of its being a condition does not deprive form of its externality vis-à-vis that which appears within its framework. This aspect of form becomes prominent in the conjunction of form and law (KpV 5: 35/35), since law as such does not entail the presence of material or its direction. Form understood as law is the form of universality. Even as there is a gap between framework and material, so is there a gap between universality and the particular cases which can be subsumed under it but cannot be derived from it. Hence, when we try to decipher the meaning of form or formalism in the context of ethics, we must be more specific, so as to appreciate the impact of universality on the very direction of ethics. This will be the first step in our exploration.