

The Basing Relation

Ram Neta

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

1. Our Topic

So-Hyun watches Al-Jazeera and also watches CNN. She watches Al-Jazeera because she thinks it reliably provides accurate information, but she watches CNN just for entertainment. Let's stipulate, however, that the two stations are equally reliable in their news coverage, and that So-Hyun's total evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that both stations are equally highly reliable. She just happens to believe—against her evidence—that Al-Jazeera is more reliable than CNN, and so she unjustifiably trusts Al-Jazeera more than CNN.

Both stations report that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria, and So-Hyun sees both reports. Now, there are *two reasons* for So-Hyun to believe that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria. The first reason is that Al-Jazeera—which So-Hyun knows to be a highly reliable news source—reported it. The second reason is that CNN—which is an equally highly reliable news source, and which So-

Thanks to three anonymous referees, as well as the editors of the *Philosophical Review*, and Selim Berker, Anna-Sara Malmgren, and Eric Marcus, for extraordinarily generous and astute comments on several earlier drafts of this material. I am also grateful for helpful discussion with David Barnett, Paul Boghossian, Matthew Boyle, Adam Carter, John Hyman, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Matthew Kotzen, Tamar Lando, Douglas Lavin, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, Adam Leite, Errol Lord, Lisa Miracchi, Kate Nolfi, Antonia Peacocke, John Phillips, Karl Schafer, Miriam Schoenfield, Mark Schroeder, John Schwenkler, Keshav Singh, and Alex Worsnip.

Philosophical Review, Vol. 128, No. 2, 2019

DOI 10.1215/00318108-7374945

© 2019 by Cornell University

Hyun has equal justification for believing to be a highly reliable news source—reported it.¹

Furthermore, So-Hyun is aware of both reports and knows that each report says that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria. Thus, in at least some ordinary sense of the term, So-Hyun “has” both reasons to believe that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria.² Of course, So-Hyun would not *grant* that she has two reasons to believe that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria because, recall, she doesn’t take CNN’s report to be a reason to believe. Finally, So-Hyun actually *does* believe that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria. But she believes it for *only one* of the two reasons that she has to believe it, namely, that Al-Jazeera reported it.

In the case I’ve just described, So-Hyun has two reasons to believe that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria, but she believes it for only one of those reasons. To believe some proposition *p*, and to have a reason *R* to believe that *p*, is not thereby to believe that *p* for reason *R*. What is involved in So-Hyun’s believing that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria *for the reason* that Al-Jazeera reported it, but not for the other reason she has to believe it, namely, that CNN reported it? The answer to this last question may seem obvious: what makes it the case that So-Hyun forms her belief for one of these reasons and not for the other is that she forms the belief in question *because* the event is reported on Al-Jazeera, not *because* it is reported on CNN. But, as Donald Davidson pointed out decades ago, if this answer is to be correct, then not just any old explanatory relation can be signified by “because” in that answer.³

1. These stipulations about the case can and should be understood in such a way that they are neutral on the metaphysical debates concerning the ontology of reasons. Some philosophers (see, e.g., Unger 1975, Hornsby 2007, Marcus 2012, McDowell 2013, and Hyman 2015) think that reasons are facts, others think that reasons are propositions (see, e.g., Fantl and McGrath 2009), and still others think that reasons are mental states of one or another kind (see, e.g., Turri 2009). My stipulations concerning So-Hyun can all be framed in a way consistent with each of these views.

2. Does *having a reason to F* consist in the conjunction of (a) there being a reason to *F* and (b) one’s standing in some epistemic relation of “having” to that reason? Schroeder 2008 argues that the answer to this question is no. In this article, I remain neutral on this “factorability” issue, as well as various other issues concerning what is involved in “having” a reason, for example, having a high credence in the propositional content of that reason, being justified in believing the content of that reason, occupying some mental state that itself constitutes the reason, and so on.

3. See Davidson 1963. Davidson was explicitly discussing intentional action rather than belief—but his point applies to belief as well.

Davidson tried to explain the difference between *reasons that one has to act* (what are sometimes called “possessed normative reasons”) and *reasons for which one acts* (or what are sometimes called “motivating reasons”⁴ or “operative reasons”⁵) as a difference consisting in the fact that the latter must be, but the former need not be, reasons that *cause* one’s action. Although this view has been widely accepted, some philosophers have objected to the claim that our intentional actions are caused by the reasons for which we do them.⁶ Rather than get involved in this controversy, let me try to locate Davidson’s insight in a way that does not take on controversial commitments about causation. Davidson’s insight, stated in a way that’s acceptable both to Davidson and to those philosophers who reject his characterization of motivating reasons as causes, is this: a *reason for which* you act is always an answer to “a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ . . . that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting” (Anscombe 1957: 9). If we use the term “explanation” to denote any adequate answer to Anscombe’s “Why?” question,⁷ then we can state Davidson’s insight by saying that your *reasons for which* are always “explanatory” reasons, whether or not the relevant kind of explanation is causal.

An analogous point holds true of belief: a *reason for which* you believe is always a *reason why* you believe. Even critics of the view that reasons for which we believe are causes of our beliefs grant that the *reasons for which* we believe constitute answers to “a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ . . . that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for” our believing.⁸ Such philosophers admit that the reasons for which we believe

4. The phrase “motivating reasons” conceals an important distinction: Hyman 2015 helpfully distinguishes the *reasons for which* the agent acted from the *motives from which* she acted: the former (according to Hyman 2015) are facts of which the agent is aware, whereas the latter are goals that the agent pursues. Of course, just as there are disputes concerning the ontology of normative reasons, there are also disputes concerning the ontology of *reasons for which* (are they facts? propositions? mental states? Etc.). Although the present article will attempt to remain neutral on their ontology, I will write as if *reasons for which* have propositional content (e.g., I will speak of an agent’s justification for believing such reasons), but my arguments could be reframed to avoid this assumption.

5. I avoid the use of the popular term “operative reasons” (see, e.g., Scanlon 1998) for *reasons for which* since it contentiously suggests that the explanation provided by *reasons for which* is causal explanation. Grammar ends up being the victim of my expository decision: I repeatedly use the expression “reasons for which” as a noun phrase.

6. See Anscombe 1957 on “mental causes,” and Dancy 2000.

7. Since, as Skow 2016 points out, not all true answers to “Why?” questions are explanations, I stipulate that I will not count an answer to Anscombe’s “Why?” question as “adequate” unless it is both true and explanatory.

8. See Lehrer 1971 and Setiya 2013.

are the reasons that render those beliefs excusable or justified or knowledgeable (when they are).⁹ If So-Hyun has two reasons to believe that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria, and she believes it for only one of those reasons, then, according to the anticausalists, the *reason for which* she believes it must be the reason that renders her belief justified or knowledgeable (if it is). But, even on the anticausalist view, a reason can render her belief justified or knowledgeable only if that reason is an answer to Anscombe's sense of the question "why does she believe it?" Thus, even the anticausalists are committed to claiming that *reasons for which* are *reasons why*.

Causalists and anticausalists alike accept that all *reasons for which* are *reasons why*. But not all *reasons why* are *reasons for which*. The reason *why* she believes that she can fly is that she suffers from psychosis; but that she suffers from psychosis is not a reason *for which* she believes that she can fly. Even though all *reasons for which* are *reasons why*, not all *reasons why* are *reasons for which*.

Although we've been focused on So-Hyun's belief, the points that we've made generalize beyond beliefs. There are the reasons for which someone raises her hand, the reasons for which she is angry, the reasons for which she intends to drink a toxin, the reasons for which she prefers eating at home to eating out, and the reasons for which she chooses the road less traveled. More generally, there are reasons for which an agent is, I will say, in a "rationally determinable condition" (henceforth, RDC) — whether that condition takes the form of a belief, a judgment, an emotion, an intention, a preference, a choice, or an action.¹⁰ The project of this article is to gain a better understanding of the explanatory relation (whether causal or not) that holds between *reasons for which*, on the one hand, and the RDC's for which they are reasons, on the other.

In order to streamline the exposition in what follows, I will alternate between speaking of an agent A "being in" a particular RDC or that

9. Lehrer explicitly admits this only for the case in which the reasons for which we believe are reasons that, as he says, "give us knowledge"—I take this to mean that our believing *for those reasons* is what makes it the case that our belief is knowledgeably held (Lehrer 1971, 312). Since I see no reason why Lehrer would want to grant this for reasons that make our belief knowledgeable, but not for reasons that make our belief enjoy some lesser epistemic status, I assume that he would grant as much for the latter reasons.

10. It is a further question, and one that I will not address in this article, why some conditions are rationally determinable and others are not. See Neta 2018 for an account of rationally determinable conditions that builds on the account of rational relations in Smith 2005 and the account of evaluative control in Hieronymi 2014.

agent's "C'ing"—that is, I will use "C" as a schematic variable ranging over verb phrases like "believe that," "intend to," "resent," "intentionally steal from," and so on.

Epistemologists sometimes use the phrase "the basing relation" to denote the distinctive kind of explanatory relation that holds between a belief and the reason for which it is held. I will generalize this usage of "the basing relation" to cover the explanatory relation between a reason and the RDC for which it is a reason.¹¹ Using the phrase in this way, I can now state the goal of this article:

In this article, I will give an account of the basing relation.

2. Two Questions for an Account of the Basing Relation to Address

In the preceding section I noted that not all *reasons why* are *reasons for which*. The attempt to specify which *reasons why* are *reasons for which* has become known by causalists as solving the problem of "the deviant causal chain," but, as I argued in the preceding section, a version of this problem also faces anticausalists. I propose, therefore, to call it the problem of "the deviant explanatory chain." My account of the basing relation will solve this problem. That is to say, it will answer the question

(Q1) Which *reasons why* are also *reasons for which*?

My account will answer Q1 in a way that explains an otherwise puzzling feature of the difference between reasons why that *are*, and reasons why that *are not*, reasons for which. It is a striking feature of reasons for which that the agent *for whom* they are reasons is *sometimes* (if he or she possesses metarepresentational powers) able to know that they are his or her reasons in a way that is very different from the way in which others are able to know that they are his or her reasons. It is *sometimes* possible for me to know the reasons for which I think something or do something simply by reflecting on what my reasons are, whereas it is *never* possible for others to know my reasons in the same way: others can know what my reasons are only by observing my behavior or appealing to my testimony, and so on.

11. Though most philosophers would accept that the explanatory relation in question is the same across different kinds of RDC, Kieran Setiya (2013) is a noteworthy exception: he argues that the epistemic basing relation, though explanatory in some sense, is different in kind from the explanatory relation that obtains between an intentional action and the reason for which it is done. I don't have the space here to argue against Setiya's view, but Neta forthcoming-b is devoted to showing both that his argument is unsound and his conclusion is false.

But this epistemic asymmetry does not hold generally concerning the reasons why my muscles contracted and expanded as they did, the reasons why my foveae saccaded as they did, or the reasons why neural firings occurred when they did—in all of the latter cases, my knowledge of the reasons why will be every bit as empirical as anyone else’s knowledge. The answer I develop to Q1 will help us to understand why it is that it is sometimes possible for agents to know their own *reasons for which* in a different way than they can know others’ reasons for which.¹²

Besides Q1, there is another question that my account of the basing relation will answer. In order to spell out that other question, let’s begin by considering the distinction between what epistemologists call “doxastic justification” and what they call “propositional justification.” Doxastic justification is a property of an agent’s belief at a time, while propositional justification is a relation between an agent and a proposition at a time. To say that an agent has propositional justification for a particular proposition at a particular time is to say that, at that time, the agent satisfies whatever conditions she must in order for it be (in some relevant way, about which theorists may differ) normatively appropriate for her to believe that proposition, whether or not he or she does believe it. To say that a belief is doxastically justified is to attribute some corresponding kind of normative appropriateness to a belief that an agent actually holds at a time.

Just as we can contrast the propositional justification that an agent has for believing something (whether or not she believes it) with the doxastic justification that a particular belief enjoys, so too can we contrast two kinds of justificatory status pertaining to RDC’s other than belief. We may contrast the justification that an agent possesses for being in a particular RDC, whether or not she occupies that RDC, with the justification that a particular RDC enjoys by virtue of the way in which the agent occupies that RDC. I take doxastic justification to be just one species of the latter genus, and I will use the phrase “ex post justification”¹³ to denote that genus. I contrast ex post justification with ex ante justification, which is the kind of justification that an agent has for being in a particular RDC,

12. See Cunningham 2016 (esp. sec. 4) and Neta forthcoming-a for a discussion of the epistemic privilege that we can have with respect to our own reasons for which.

13. Goldman 1979 distinguishes “ex post” justification, which is the justification that a belief has by virtue of being formed or sustained in the right way, from “ex ante” justification, which is the justification that an agent has for holding a belief (whether or not she does hold it).

whether or not he or she is in it. I will add three remarks about what's involved in ex post justification:

- (a) *At least sometimes*, when an agent A is in a particular RDC, and that RDC enjoys ex post justification, the latter is true *partly* because A has normative reason to be in that RDC. For instance, my intention to wipe the windshield is justified because I have a reason to so intend; my belief that the building is on fire is justified because I have a reason to so believe, and so on. In such cases, an RDC's ex post justification involves the agent's having a normative reason to be in that RDC.
- (b) But having a normative reason to be in a particular RDC, and also being in that RDC, are typically not jointly sufficient for that RDC to enjoy ex post justification. *If one's normative reason to be in an RDC is involved in a particular case of ex post justification, it must be involved as a basis of the RDC.* (I emphasize that this is true *if* a reason is involved in a particular case of ex post justification: I leave it open whether there are cases of ex post justified RDC's that are not based on reasons.)
- (c) Even if an agent has a normative reason to be in a particular RDC, and the agent is in that RDC, and that normative reason is the basis for (i.e., the reason for which the agent is in) the RDC itself, that *still* is not sufficient for ex post justification: the agent's C'ing for that normative reason may have its ex post justification defeated in various ways. The following example will be especially interesting for our purposes:

“Mr. Ponens and Mr. F. A. Lacy each knows the following things:

- (P5) The Spurs will win if they play the Pistons.
- (P6) The Spurs will play the Pistons.

This is a paradigm case of propositional justification. < The Spurs will win > is propositionally justified for each man because he knows (P5) and (P6). . . . From these two premises, and only these premises, each man draws the conclusion:

- (P7) Therefore, the Spurs will win.

But the devil is in the details. Ponens applies *modus ponens* to reach the conclusion. Lacy, however, applies a different inference rule, which we may call *modus profusus*: for any p , q , and r : $(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r$. Lacy's belief that the

Spurs will win is definitely not doxastically justified; following that rule could never lead to a justified belief” (Turri 2010: 317).¹⁴

Such examples illustrate that having a normative reason to be in a particular RDC, and basing one’s RDC on that possessed normative reason, do not jointly suffice for one’s RDC to be ex post justified. As John Turri’s case shows, for an RDC to be ex post justified on the basis of one’s normative reason to be in that RDC, the basing relation must also be of the appropriate kind (e.g., proceeding through *modus ponens*, rather than *modus profusus*).

But what distinguishes basing relations that are of the appropriate kind from those that are not? Is it that basing relations are of the appropriate kind only if they proceed in accordance with *valid* rules of inference (as in the *modus ponens* vs. *modus profusus* case above)? That’s too strong, since it implies that beliefs that result from inductive or abductive inference could not be doxastically justified. Is it then that basing relations are of the appropriate kind if they proceed in accordance with *conditionally reliable* rules of inference (rules in which the conclusion is usually true when the premises are true)? That’s too weak, since it implies that all beliefs formed by inferences that proceed in accordance with the rule

From any premises, conclude any necessary truth.

could be doxastically justified. And worse still, both of the preceding proposals fail to account for the appropriateness of noninferential basing relations—for instance, those in which a belief is based on perceptual experiences rather than other beliefs.

What Turri’s example shows is this. Take any case in which an agent has normative reason for C’ing, and C’s on the basis of R. Only *some* such instances of the basing relation result in the agent’s C’ing ex post justifiably. Let’s adopt the terminological convention of referring to such instances of the basing relation as “justifying”; all other instances are “nonjustifying.” Using this terminology, we can now ask the question

(Q2) What is the difference between *justifying* instances of the basing relation (i.e., those instances that generate ex post justifiedness for an agent’s C’ing, given that she C’s on the basis of normative reason that she has for C’ing) and *nonjustifying* ones (i.e., those that do not)?

14. Roderick Firth anticipates Turri’s point: see Firth 1998.

My account of the basing relation will answer Q2 in a way that explains an otherwise puzzling feature of the difference between instances of the basing relations that are justifying and instances that are nonjustifying. I'll illustrate this feature by elaborating our story about So-Hyun.

As we've told the story up to now, "the reason" for which So-Hyun believes that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria is that Al-Jazeera reported it. But someone might protest that this reason can do its normative and explanatory work only if it is the tip of a whole iceberg of reasons. Rather than explore the issue of what, if anything, this iceberg must include, I will just use "R" to designate the totality of the *reasons for which* So-Hyun believes that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria, and I will not worry about what, precisely, is included in R: let it be as inclusive as you please, consistent with the stipulations of the case.

Now suppose that someone whom So-Hyun knows to be an eminent expert (if necessary, let this expert be a mind-reading logician and statistician) comes to her and, after going through a careful examination of So-Hyun's reasons and her belief, authoritatively asserts the following: "So-Hyun, you are absolutely right to believe everything in R—all of its contents are true, I assure you! Nonetheless, you are mistaken to think that those contents support the hypothesis that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria. In fact, I can *prove* that the totality of your reasons R does *not* support that hypothesis about Russian forces, but is entirely neutral with respect to that hypothesis." Finally, let's suppose that the eminent expert is wrong about the support relation at issue—in fact, R *does* support the hypothesis that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria, and the expert's "proof" is unsound, but in a way that is too subtle or sophisticated for So-Hyun to be able to detect. In such a case, what epistemological effects does the expert's testimony have on So-Hyun? Although the recent literature on higher-order defeat concerns various controversies surrounding this question,¹⁵ we can make some observations about this case that are not controversial in that literature.

First, the expert's testimony *need not* have any negative effect on So-Hyun's possessing all of the normative reasons in R; if anything, the first sentence of the expert's testimony makes her possession of those normative reasons in R even more secure than it was before. It follows that the expert's testimony need have no negative impact on So-Hyun's *having*

15. See, for instance, the discussion of "Sleepy Detective" in Horowitz 2014, along with the discussions of related cases in Worsnip 2018 and Lasonen-Aarnio 2014 and forthcoming.

good normative reasons to believe that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria, even if it adds a defeater to those reasons. Second, since So-Hyun recognizes the expert to be an epistemic *superior* on precisely that issue concerning which the expert delivers false testimony—namely, whether R supports So-Hyun’s belief—the expert’s testimony is bound to have some negative impact on the *ex post* justification of So-Hyun’s belief that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria. If So-Hyun simply persists in her belief about the Russian forces, and does so on the basis of R *without having any reason to discount the expert’s testimony*, then her belief concerning Russian forces loses *ex post* justifiedness.¹⁶

It follows from these two uncontroversial points I’ve just made that, if So-Hyun continues to base her belief about Russian forces on R alone even after hearing the expert’s testimony, then that will be a non-justifying instance of the basing relation. It’s important to be clear on the difference between this uncontroversial claim, on the one hand, and nearby controversies in the contemporary literature on higher-order defeaters, on the other. For instance, I remain neutral on such controversial issues as whether the expert’s testimony makes any impact on the *ex ante* justifiedness of So-Hyun’s belief,¹⁷ which *revisions* So-Hyun ought to make to her beliefs or her credal states upon receipt of the expert’s testimony, and how any of this relates to questions about knowledge, evidence, or epistemic priority.

This elaborated example about So-Hyun illustrates a more general point that applies to all RDC’s that are based on reasons. If I am justified in thinking that the reasons for which I am grateful to you do not support my gratitude, then my gratitude is not *ex post* justified—even if I

16. Titelbaum 2015 argues that there are cases in which the very same reasons that justify a believer in holding a belief can also justify the believer in discounting testimony to the effect that that belief is unjustified. But no author argues that *all* cases are like this; Titelbaum, in particular, argues the point only for cases involving beliefs about the requirements of rationality—and the case of So-Hyun is clearly not of this kind.

17. See van Wietmarschen 2013 and Silva 2016 for arguments to the effect that expert testimony of the kind imagined here affects *not* the *ex ante* justification that So-Hyun has for believing that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria, but *only* the *ex post* justification of her belief, if it continues to be held on the same basis. In this article, I do not commit myself one way or another on the issue of whether such higher-order evidence against one’s C’ing affects one’s *ex ante* justification for C’ing. In Neta 2017, I contrast two different conceptions of the relation between *ex ante* and *ex post* justification; which of these conceptions we adopt will determine the verdicts we should issue here concerning So-Hyun’s *ex ante* justification. Thanks to an anonymous referee for the *Philosophical Review* for bringing this issue to my attention.

continue to be grateful for those same reasons, and they are, in fact, good reasons for me to be grateful. If I am justified in thinking that the reasons for which I am planning to move do not support my planning to move, then my planning is not *ex post* justified—even if I continue to plan for those same reasons, and they are, in fact, good reasons for me so to plan. The point is fully general: *When an agent is ultima facie justified in thinking that a particular instance of the basing relation for one of her own current RDC's is nonjustifying, that suffices for that particular instance of the basing relation to be nonjustifying.*

Two cautionary points about the claim I've just made. First, I have *not* said that *believing* one's RDC to be unjustified is sufficient for it to not be *ex post* justified. Huck Finn might, for instance, *believe* that he is unjustified in helping Jim escape, but this belief does not suffice for his act to not be *ex post* justified: Huck's act of helping Jim escape is *ex post* justified even if Huck believes that it is unjustified. If Huck were *justified* in believing that he should return Jim to the slave owner, then he would also be justified in reasoning from this belief to various conclusions about what would be best for him to do, and so would be justified in not helping Jim escape. But this is not an accurate understanding of Huck's situation, even if it is Huck's own inaccurate conception of his situation: whatever indications Huck may receive from his elders concerning the rights of slave-owners, those indications are defeated by Huck's own powerful conscience. Second, my claim is that justifying basing requires that the agent *not* be justified in thinking that the basing is nonjustifying. This condition that can be satisfied by creatures that are incapable of possessing higher-order representations or justifications; thus, it cannot imply that justifying basing requires some positive higher-order justification, for example, that the agent *be justified in thinking that the basing is justifying*. I do not assume that justifying basing requires any such higher-order justification.

I've argued by appeal to examples that when an agent is justified in taking a particular instance of the basing relation for one of her own current RDC's to be nonjustifying, that suffices for that particular instance of the basing relation to be nonjustifying. But why is this the case? In particular, why is an instance of the basing relation normatively correlated with the agent's own current justification for taking it to be nonjustifying, but not with that same agent's *subsequent* justification for taking it to be nonjustifying, or with any *other* agent's justification for taking it to be nonjustifying? I seek an account of the basing relation that doesn't merely answer Q2, but also answers this more specific question about the rela-

tion between a basing relation's being nonjustifying, on the one hand, and whether the agent is justified in taking it to be nonjustifying, on the other.

3. What Sort of Account Will Answer Our Two Questions?

Recall our two main questions:

- (Q1) Which *reasons why* are also *reasons for which*?
- (Q2) What is the difference between *justifying* instances of the basing relation (i.e., those instances that generate ex post justifiedness for an agent's C'ing, given that she C's on the basis of normative reason that she has for C'ing) and *nonjustifying* ones (i.e., those that do not)?

Most of the literature on the basing relation (at least in epistemology) focuses on answering Q1 above, and does so by developing a causal or counterfactual account of that relation. Moser 1989 and McCain 2012 both offer causal accounts of the relation. Swain 1979, 1981, and 1985 offer increasingly sophisticated counterfactual accounts of the relation.¹⁸ And Korcz 2000 offers an account of the basing relation according to which conditions like those spelled out in earlier causal accounts of basing are sufficient, but not necessary, for basing. But Sosa 2015 argues persuasively that the causal element in basing must be understood in terms of *manifestation of a disposition*, on pain of running once again into the problem of the deviant explanatory chain, and so failing to answer Q1 adequately.¹⁹ Because Sosa has already made the case against causal and counterfactual accounts of basing that don't appeal to the manifestation of a disposition, I do not discuss those accounts any further in this article. The accounts that escape Sosa's criticism, and that I therefore find more promising, can be sorted into two nonexclusive categories.²⁰

According to one kind of view, for an agent to C based on a reason R involves the agent's *exercising a disposition* to C when R. The various versions of this view will answer Q1 by appeal to the distinctive kind of

18. See Tolliver 1982 for a powerful counterexample to counterfactual accounts of basing.

19. See Sosa 2015, chap. 1.

20. The two categories that I discuss in this section each correspond to one of the two horns of the dilemma identified in Lavin 2011 as the dilemma of automatism and contemplativism. This article identifies a view of the basing relation that can slip between the horns of Lavin's dilemma.

explanation that we give of C when we describe C as an exercise of the agent's disposition to C when R. And they all answer Q2 by claiming that the basing relation is justifying only when the agent exercises this disposition *properly*. Whether propriety requires reliability, or reliability in normal circumstances, or sensitivity, or safety, or what have you, is a matter of dispute among different versions of the view. Let's call all such views versions of the "dispositionalist" account of basing.

Part of what makes this dispositionalist account attractive is that it offers a plausible answer to Q1: when an agent C's for the reason R, the agent is responsible for doing so, and such responsibility involves *her* exercise of her own dispositions (however transient), and not merely an exercise of some dispositions of her organs or subsystems. In so far as it is the agent herself who is C'ing for a reason R, the C'ing must manifest some disposition, however fleeting, of the agent herself.²¹

According to another kind of view of the basing relation, for an agent to C based on reason R involves the agent's representing R as justifying her C'ing. Different versions of this view will answer Q1 by appeal to the distinctive kind of explanation that appeals to representations, though they may differ as to what kind of representation it is, that is, doxastic, perceptual, or intuitive, and how its content is to be spelled out, that is, what notion of justification is involved, the guise under which it is presented, and so on. And they will answer Q2 by claiming that the basing relation is justifying only when this representation is, as Sosa would say, an *adroit* exercise of the relevant representational capacity. (To say that the representation is "adroit" is not merely to say that the representational capacity is a skill—it is to say that the representation is a skillful exercise of that skill. If the accuracy of representation manifests this skillfulness, the representation is then, in Sosa's terms, "apt.") Let's say all these views are versions of the "representationalist" account of the basing relation.

Part of what makes this representationalist account attractive is that it offers a plausible answer to Q2: when an agent C's for the reason R, the agent is, in some sense, *committed to R's* justifying her C'ing, and the agent's C'ing for the reason R is *ex post* justified only in so far as, and because, that commitment is itself justified. It's plausible that such com-

21. The earliest dispositionalist account of the basing relation I can find is suggested by Winters 1983 (though she focuses on inference specifically, and not the basing relation in general). But such accounts of the basing relation are also offered by Evans 2012, Sosa 2015, Mantel 2017, and Lord 2016. Lord and Sosa each take the relevant dispositions to be competences, and take the notion of competence as a primitive.

mitment is one that an agent undertakes by a representation of some kind. Defeating the agent's justification for that representation would defeat her justification for the commitment.²²

Of course, dispositionalism and representationalism as I've defined them are compatible with each other, and some of the most sophisticated recent literature advances are hybrids of the two. I consider the views separately in order to expose more clearly the challenges to each—challenges that any hybrid of the views will have to meet.

In sum, the dispositionalist claims:

- (D1) *basing* C on R involves the agent's exercising a disposition to C when R, and
- (D2) *justifying basing* of C on R consists in the agent properly exercising that disposition.

And the representationalist claims:

- (R1) *basing* C on R involves the agent's representing R as justifying C, and
- (R2) *justifying basing* of C on R consists in the adroitness of this representation.

I said that dispositionalism offers a plausible answer to Q1 and that representationalism offers a plausible answer to Q2. But in the remainder of this section, I will articulate a challenge to the dispositionalist to provide an adequate answer to Q2, and a separate challenge to the representationalist to provide an adequate answer to Q1. I will conclude this section by spelling out what any version of dispositionalism or representationalism—including any hybrid of the two—must do in order to meet the challenges that I've presented to each respectively. In the next section, I begin to develop my own hybrid view, and in the final section, I complete the articulation of this hybrid view and show that it meets all of these challenges that I've set out.

22. Representationalist accounts of the basing relation are suggested in Thomson 1967 (which focuses on inference specifically) and Lehrer 1971 (which focuses on knowledge-conferring reasons specifically), and they are explicitly offered in Longino 1978, Leite 2004, Marcus 2012 and Valaris 2014. The most influential recent statement of representationalism concerning theoretical inference is in Boghossian 2014, in particular his argument for the "taking condition" on inference.

3.1. *The Challenge for Dispositionalism*

The dispositionalist explains the basing relation (C'ing for the reason that R) as an exercise of a disposition to C when R, and she explains *justifying* basing as the proper exercise of this disposition. Can such a view give an adequate answer to Q2? In particular, can it explain why it is that justification for taking a current instance of the basing relation in oneself to be nonjustifying suffices for that instance to be nonjustifying?

Suppose that Nyambi has a disposition to believe what he hears reported on CNN, but he is not aware of having this disposition. He does, however, have a fully justified, false belief that he does *not* have this disposition, and he also has a fully justified false belief that he has a disposition to believe what he hears reported on Al-Jazeera. Suppose furthermore that Nyambi hears the report about Russian forces on CNN, exercises his actual disposition properly (whatever precisely is involved in such proper exercise), and thereby comes to believe that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria. But when asked why he holds this belief, he offers the completely sincere and justified, but false, reply that he heard it reported on Al-Jazeera. Now let's suppose that Nyambi acquires evidence that shows that CNN is much less trustworthy than Al-Jazeera—in fact, let his new evidence show that the disposition to trust CNN's report is much less proper (again, whatever precisely such propriety involves) than the disposition to trust Al-Jazeera's reports. Does this new evidence defeat the ex post justifiedness of Nyambi's belief that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria?

Given Nyambi's *justified* belief that he heard the story reported on Al-Jazeera, his acquisition of new evidence of Al-Jazeera's being extremely trustworthy (much more so than CNN) makes him *more* ex post justified in believing that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria. But if the acquisition of that evidence makes Nyambi *more* ex post justified in holding that belief, it cannot also make him *less* ex post justified in holding that belief. Thus, his acquisition of that new evidence cannot make Nyambi less justified in believing that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria. So, although Nyambi's new evidence shows that CNN is extremely untrustworthy, and thereby shows that the disposition to trust CNN's reporting is highly improper, this new evidence does not defeat the ex post justifiedness of Nyambi's belief that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria, even though, as we've stipulated, and unbe-

knownst to Nyambi, it is his disposition to trust CNN's reporting that explains his having that belief.²³

It's tempting to suppose that, in the case I've just described, Nyambi's belief that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria must be based on something other than merely his disposition to trust CNN's reporting—perhaps it's based on his *apparent recall* of hearing this news reported on Al-Jazeera. But our stipulations about the case rule this out: the case is such that Nyambi's belief is the exercise of a disposition to accept what he actually hears on CNN and *not* the exercise of any disposition to accept what he apparently recalls hearing on Al-Jazeera. Even if Nyambi actually has the latter disposition, we stipulate that his belief about Russian forces does not result from the exercise of that disposition. If this stipulation is not consistent with the rest of our stipulations about the case, then that very fact is something that the dispositionalist needs to explain.

The dispositionalist might try to explain such an inconsistency by modifying (D1) in something like the following way:

(D1') *basing*C on R involves the agent's exercising a disposition to C when both of the following conditions obtain: R, and the rest of the agent's beliefs cohere with the proposition that R justifies C'ing.²⁴

Here's how this version of dispositionalism might handle our present case. Nyambi's beliefs don't cohere with the proposition that his belief about Russian forces is justified by his having heard the report on CNN: we've said that Nyambi believes CNN's reporting to be untrustworthy, and this belief doesn't cohere with the proposition that CNN's reporting about Russian forces justifies his belief that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria. A version of dispositionalism that incorporates (D1'), therefore, would explain why our original stipulations about Nyambi's case insure that his belief is not based on the CNN report. If there is any basis for Nyambi's belief, then, it can only be his apparent recall of the Al-Jazeera report.

But in that case, why think that the antecedent of that conditional is true: why think that there is *any* basis for Nyambi's belief? Of course,

23. Of course, I leave it open whether evidence of CNN's untrustworthiness defeats Nyambi's *knowledge* that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria: perhaps evidence can destroy knowledge without destroying *ex post* justification.

24. Wedgwood 2012 defends one such version of dispositionalism, and Skow 2016 defends another. See Wedgwood 2012: 285–6; and Skow 2016: 170.

Nyambi would cite his apparent recall of an Al-Jazeera report if asked to justify his belief that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria. But what Nyambi would cite in order to justify his belief is one thing; what disposition he exercises in holding his belief is another. And according to the dispositionalist, it is only the latter that determines the reason for which he holds his belief. The former might be evidentially relevant for those of us trying to figure out the reason for which Nyambi holds his belief, but why think it is metaphysically relevant to fixing the reason for which he holds his belief?²⁵

But, if we say that there is no basis for Nyambi's belief, then it seems clear that his belief is not *ex post* justified. Perhaps it's possible for some beliefs (e.g., *I am thinking now*) to be *ex post* justified without being based on any reasons. But Nyambi's belief that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria is not such a belief: if Nyambi's belief is *ex post* justified, then there must be some reason or other for which he holds the belief.

The problem with the modified version of dispositionalism that comprises (D1') is that it doesn't solve the problem that arose in our case of Nyambi: so long as the disposition that Nyambi *actually* exercises in forming or sustaining his belief is different from the disposition that he *justifiably takes* himself to be exercising, evidence against the propriety of the former will not affect the *ex post* justification of Nyambi's belief. Both the original and the modified versions of dispositionalism allow for that difference between the dispositions that are actually explanatory of the agent's belief, on the one hand, and the dispositions that the agent justifiably takes to be explanatory of his belief, on the other. Therefore, neither version of disposition can provide an adequate answer to Q2.

Perhaps we can modify dispositionalism yet again, as follows:

(D1'') *basing*C on R involves the agent's exercising a disposition to C when both of the following two conditions obtain: R, and the agent *knows* that R is her reason for C'ing.

This new modified version of dispositionalism solves the problem that beset our earlier versions of dispositionalism by stipulating that the basing relation involves the exercise of a disposition to C for a reason that the agent *knows to be her reason*. The problem with the third modified version of dispositionalism is that it is too strong: it is possible for an

25. In issuing this response, the dispositionalist is assuming what Leite 2004 calls the "spectatorial conception" of doxastic justification. In sections 4 and 5 of this article, I defend a version of dispositionalism that rejects the spectatorial conception.

agent to C for the reason that R, even though the agent doesn't know that she is C'ing for the reason that R. If this were not possible, we could never *discover* the reasons for which we do things.

I've argued that, although the dispositionalist has a plausible answer to Q1, she faces a challenge in answering Q2: if the dispositions exercised in the basing relation are dispositions that the agent can *justifiably misidentify* (i.e., have fully justified false beliefs concerning which dispositions they are) *while exercising them*, then the dispositionalist cannot explain the fact that an agent's justification for believing a current instance of a basing relation is nonjustifying suffices to make that instance nonjustifying. But on what grounds could the dispositionalist deny the antecedent of this conditional? Without imposing implausibly strong conditions on the basing relation, how can the dispositionalist explain why it is that the dispositions exercised in the basing relations are dispositions that the agent cannot justifiably misidentify while exercising them? We will eventually return to this question.

3.2. *The Challenge for Representationalism*

Now let's consider representationalism, which explains the basing of C on R as involving a representation, of some appropriate sort, of R as justifying C'ing, and explains justifying instances of the basing relation as involving a justified representation of this same sort. (It is by virtue of this representation, recall, that the agent is committed to R's justifying her C'ing.) I will now show that the representationalist faces a challenge in answering Q1.

Consider Toshiro: he hears the CNN report that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria. He also represents (in whatever way the representationalist takes to be involved in basing—this qualification to remain implicit in what follows) CNN as a trustworthy news source in cases such as this, and so he believes that the CNN report provides him with justification for believing that Russian forces have just bombed civilian targets in Syria. And furthermore, after watching the CNN report, he believes that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria. Unbeknownst to Toshiro, however, the latter belief about Russian forces was formed just a few milliseconds before he had finished parsing the sentences of the CNN broadcast. It was formed as the result of subliminal messages coming from his TV screen—messages the content of which would in fact justify his belief that Russian forces attacked civilian targets in Syria. Furthermore, the CNN broadcast itself cannot help to explain Toshiro's belief: the subliminal messages coming from Toshiro's TV

screen cause Toshiro not only to believe that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria but also to suffer from a temporary but severe aphasia that prevents him from putting together his belief about the trustworthiness of CNN with his belief about the content of its broadcast to deduce any consequences from their conjunction. In such a case, Toshiro believes that CNN reported that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria, and he also represents CNN as a trustworthy news source, and he also believes that Russian forces did bomb civilian targets in Syria; thus, he apparently satisfies the conditions of R1 for basing his belief about Russian forces on the CNN report. Nonetheless, his aphasia prevents any such basing relation from obtaining: since the third belief is not explained by either or both of the first two things, it also cannot be based on either or both of them, or their contents.

The representationalist could respond to this example by modifying R1 as follows:

(R1') for an agent to C based on reason R involves not merely the agent's representing R as justifying C—it also involves *this latter representation (or its content) being part of the reason why the agent C's.*

The second condition of (R1') is not satisfied by Toshiro in the example above, and the representationalist might argue that this is what accounts for the fact that Toshiro does not base his belief that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria on CNN's report. But this modified representationalist view does not rule out the possibility that the agent's representation of *R as justifying C* explains why the agent C's, but only via some deviant explanatory chain. For example, suppose that the subliminal message comes from Toshiro's TV screen just when, and just *because*, Toshiro represents CNN reports as justifying belief in their contents. (We can suppose that the messages are broadcast by a mind-reading demon intent on putting Toshiro into a situation that poses an explanatory challenge for representationalism.) In this case, the latter representation (or its content) is a *reason why* Toshiro believes that Russian forces have bombed civilian targets in Syria, because it is a reason why the causally relevant subliminal message is broadcast in the first place. But it still is not a *reason for which* Toshiro holds the latter belief. The explanatory relation between the representation and the belief is not a basing relation; it is still a deviant explanatory relation. And so even the modified representationalist view cannot explain why it is that Toshiro's belief that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria is not based on the CNN report. *If* the exotic situation I'm describing is not possible, representationalism, as

articulated so far, offers us no explanation of *why* it is not possible, and so offers no adequate answer to Q1.²⁶

Perhaps the representationalist will try to meet this explanatory challenge by modifying his or her view yet again, as follows:

(R1'') for an agent to C, based on reason R, involves not merely the agent's representing R as justifying C—it also involves the agent's *knowing* that R makes her C'ing ex post justified.

The second condition of (R1'') is not satisfied by Toshiro in either of the examples above, so the representationalist might argue that this is what accounts for the fact that Toshiro does not base his belief that Russian forces bombed civilian targets in Syria on CNN's reporting. But while this strengthened representationalist account of basing would now rule out the two versions of the Toshiro case above as not cases of basing, it would also rule out many cases that clearly are cases of basing. Often, we C on some basis that we take to be a good reason to C, even though it is not a good reason to C. In such cases, although we don't meet the conditions specified in (R1''), it is nonetheless clear that our C'ing is based on some reason. Therefore, this strengthened representationalist account of basing is too strong.

According to the representationalist, for an agent to C for the reason R involves the agent's representing R as justifying her C'ing, and thereby committing herself to R's justifying her C'ing. But what we just saw is that, unless the agent's representing R as justifying her C'ing somehow fixes the explanation of her C'ing, it cannot solve the problem of the deviant explanatory chain. But the only way that we've seen so far for the agent's representation to fix the explanation of her C'ing is if the representation involves the agent's knowledge that her C'ing is ex post justified. And this is far too strong a condition to impose on the basing relation: agents often base their RDC's on some reasons even without knowing that the RDC's so based are ex post justified.

26. Marcus 2012 develops a representationalist account of the basing relation that tries to rule out deviant explanatory relations by claiming that, *when the agent is engaged with her reasons*, then her representation of the basis as a good normative reason for that which is based on it *constitutes* the explanatory relation in question. As will become clear in the next section, I believe that Marcus's account is on the right track in taking the agent's representation to be constitutively related to the explanatory relation at issue. My own account is designed to spell out the unexplicated notion of *engagement* to which he appeals.

3.3. *A Hybrid View?*

We are assessing accounts of the basing relation by appeal to their ability to answer two questions:

- (Q1) Which *reasons why* are also *reasons for which*?
- (Q2) What is the difference between *justifying* instances of the basing relation and *nonjustifying* ones?

What makes the dispositionalist answer to Q2 plausible is that it is obviously true of the typical case: when an agent C's for the reason R, she properly exercises a disposition to C when R, and if she becomes justified in thinking that she is exercising that disposition improperly, her C'ing will typically thereby have its ex post justifiedness defeated, even if her acceptance of R is not defeated. But if the agent, *while C'ing*, justifiably misidentifies which disposition she exercises in C'ing, then this answer to Q2 generates the false prediction that her C'ing can have its ex post justifiedness defeated by evidence that clearly justifies the agent in believing that her C'ing results from her properly exercising her dispositions. This problem can arise so long as the dispositionalist takes the dispositions involved in the basing relation to be dispositions that the agent can justifiably misidentify even while exercising them. *The only way for the dispositionalist to solve this problem is to think of the dispositions involved in the basing relation as dispositions that the agent cannot justifiably misidentify while exercising them.* But how can she explain why the dispositions have this feature, without imposing implausibly strong conditions on basing?

What makes the representationalist explanation of basing plausible is that, when an agent C's for the reason R, the agent is, in some sense, committed to R's justifying her C'ing; and justification for taking this commitment to be incorrect will typically defeat the ex post justifiedness of the C'ing. A prima facie problem for the representationalist account of basing is that it fails to specify the sort of explanation for C'ing that is involved in basing: it fails to answer Q1. This is a problem that can arise so long as the representationalist thinks of the commitments that the agent makes in C'ing for the reason that R as leaving open the explanation of why she C's. *The only way for the representationalist to solve this problem is to think of those commitments as fixing the explanation of why one C's.* But, again, how can she explain why the commitments have this feature, without imposing implausibly strong conditions on basing?

Could we meet these challenges to dispositionalism and to representationalism by explaining the basing relation in a way that involves

some combination of the representation that R justifies C, and the disposition to C when accepting R? Such hybrid accounts of the basing relation are suggested in Hyman 2015 and Lord and Sylvan forthcoming. John Hyman develops an account of desires as representations individuated by dispositions, the exercises of which constitute acting on the desire, and he offers an analogous account of beliefs and of acting on beliefs.²⁷ This suggests, though it doesn't entail, the general view that C'ing for the reason R is acting on the belief that R justifies C'ing, by exercising one of the dispositions involved in believing that R justifies C'ing. And Errol Lord and Kurt Sylvan develop an account of believing for the reason R as treating R as justifying that belief, where *treating* is understood as involving a special kind of disposition (what they, following Sosa 2015, call a "competence") to form that belief when R. This suggests, though again doesn't entail, the general view that C'ing for the reason R is acting on a representation of R as justifying C'ing, by exercising a disposition involved in this representation.²⁸

In order for such hybrid views to meet the challenges that arose for representationalism, they would need to be spelled out in such a way that the representations fix the explanation of the RDC's so based; and in order for them to meet the challenges that arose for dispositionalism, they would need to be spelled out in such a way that the dispositions cannot be justifiably misidentified by the agent while she exercises them. But notice that none of these views deliver both of these results. Let's grant that basing C on R is acting on one's representation of R as justifying C'ing, and that acting on that representation involves exercising a disposition to C when R. Can such a view explain why the representation involved in one's basing C on R fixes the explanation of one's C'ing? Only if the view says that acting on one's representation of R as justifying C'ing involves exercising some *specific* kind of disposition to C when R—not just any old disposition to C when R. But if the view is spelled out in some such way, then how can it explain why the agent cannot justifiably misidentify this disposition while exercising it? In short, it's not yet clear how the hybrid views that we've mentioned can be spelled out so as to meet both of the challenges that we've posed. And without further spelling out, they don't yet meet those challenges.

In the next section, I will develop a hybrid view that meets both of those challenges. My hybrid view will be similar to those suggested by

27. See chap. 5 of Hyman 2015 on desires, and chap. 6 on beliefs.

28. See Lord and Sylvan forthcoming, sections 4.2 and 4.3.

Hyman and by Lord and Sylvan in the following respect: I take there to be a constitutive relation between the representation involved in the basing relation and the disposition exercised in the basing relation. But my view offers a different specification of what that constitutive relation is, and also of what kind of representation and what kind of disposition are involved in basing.

4. The Object-Involving Representation of a Disposition-Exercise as Justifying

An adequate account of the basing relation will have to accommodate the insights of both dispositionalism and representationalism, but it will also have to meet the challenges that I've posed to each view. To meet the challenge I've posed to dispositionalism, the disposition manifested in the basing relation must be a disposition that the agent cannot justifiably misidentify while exercising it. To meet the challenge I've posed to representationalism, the agent's commitment-constituting representation must somehow fix the explanation of her RDC. But how can these two conditions be satisfied? The present section aims to answer this question and show what kind of disposition and what kind of representation must be involved in basing.

On the hybrid view that I develop in this section and the next the basing relation involves a distinctive kind of representation and a distinctive kind of disposition. The representation it involves is a *de se*, object-involving representation of the exercise of a disposition.²⁹ Because the representation is object-involving, it cannot exist without the disposition-exercise that it represents. And the disposition that basing involves has the following property: an event is an exercise of *that particular disposition* in virtue of the agent's representing that very event by means of the kind of *de se*, object-involving representation just mentioned. Thus, no possible event could *be* an exercise of that particular disposition without such a *de se* object-involving representation of itself (i.e., of that very disposition-exercise) occurring at the same time.

Because the representation is object-involving, and thus contains the disposition-exercise that it represents, that disposition-exercise is epi-

29. I adopt the term "object-involving" from McDowell 1984. An "object-involving" representation is a representation that contains, and so is partly constituted by, the object that it represents. An "object" in the present sense can be any represented individual of any metaphysical category: it could be a process, an event, an activity, a relation, and so on.

stemically accessible to the agent in the same way as the other contents of her various thoughts and feelings are accessible to her. We can use the phrase “first-person reflection” as a label for this kind of epistemic access without prejudging controversial issues about the nature of this kind of access. But, on any plausible understanding of such access, the following claim will turn out to be true: if a belief is obviously inconsistent with some fact to which the believer enjoys first-person reflective access, then the *ex post* justifiedness of that belief is, at least to some extent, defeated.³⁰ It follows from this that *if* an agent has a false belief about the identity of the disposition she is exercising in a particular instance of the basing relation, that false belief will be, at least to some extent, defeated: since, by hypothesis, her exercise of that disposition constitutes a basing relation on this occasion, her disposition-exercise will be represented in an object-involving way, and so the fact that she is exercising that disposition on this occasion will be a fact to which she enjoys first-person reflective access. Thus, my account will meet the challenge articulated above for dispositionalism. And because the disposition is such that its exercises are individuated by the relevant representation, that representation will fix which disposition is being exercised in the agent’s C’ing: thus, my account will meet the challenge articulated above for representationalism. But so far all of this is highly schematic. In order to spell out my hybrid account, I will begin with some background observations about representations of particulars more generally.

Many representations of particulars involve some representation of a general property. When I represent a particular, even if my representation is *de se*, that representation (at least in some cases) represents the particular as a particular *of some general sort*, even if that sort is highly generic. You can represent *that color, that shape, that occurrence, that sound*, and so on, and these representations of particulars involve representations of some general property: color, shape, occurrence, sound, and so on. Note that this does *not* imply that the particular thus represented is accurately or adroitly represented *as being of this sort*. Representations of particulars can represent those particulars inaccurately or maladroitly.

30. See Smithies 2012 for an argument that we cannot have justified false beliefs about what our own current evidence consists in. Smithies’ argument clearly generalizes to non-evidential reasons. But we do not need to accept anything as controversial as Smithies’ conclusion in order to accept the claim about defeat that I am making here in the text.

However, as I said above, when the agent's representation of a particular is accurate, and its accuracy manifests the agent's adroitness in representing the particular in question, then the representation is not merely accurate and adroit, but also apt.

The basing relation, on the view that I propose here, involves the object-involving representation of a certain kind of particular (to be specified below) as having a certain general property (to be specified below). Such a representation will be more or less apt, depending on the extent to which the thinker's application of the general property represented to the particular thing represented is more or less accurate, more or less adroit, and the former more or less manifests the latter. Now, I need to say more about what kind of particular is represented, and about what general property it's represented as having, in the object-involving representations that are, on my view, involved in the basing relation.

When a particular RDC (i.e., belief, intention, emotion, etc.) is ex post justified, there is something that makes it so. We will refer to the totality of factors, whatever they are, that make the RDC ex post justified as the "ex post justifying" of the RDC. The ex post justifying of a particular RDC might include a normative reason that the agent possesses to be in that RDC; but even when it includes this, it will *also* include the RDC's standing in a justifying basing relation to that normative reason. (I use the phrase "ex post justifying," rather than "ex post justifier," since the latter phrase misleadingly sounds like it denotes *merely* the normative reason on the basis of which the agent is in C, and not the totality of what makes the agent's C'ing ex post justified.)

It has required some work just now to isolate the concept of *ex post justifying*. But, while it has required work to isolate this concept, and there is no phrase that unambiguously expresses this concept in ordinary English, that does not imply that the concept itself is not an ordinary one. In fact, the concept *ex post justifying* is possessed by anyone who is capable of asking Anscombe's very common kind of "Why?" question, and treating the answer to such a question as relevant to the issue of how normatively appropriate a particular RDC is. Children who can understand the question "Why did you do that?" clearly have the relevant concept. But current evidence indicates that, between fourteen and eighteen months, children already have an implicit ability to represent (at least nonconceptually) *why* someone did something, and to represent it *as* making the

deed more or less appropriate.³¹ In fact, even ravens seem to have such an ability as well, though their representation is nonconceptual.³²

Now my crucial thesis: *For an agent A to C for reason R* involves A's *de se*, object-involving representation of a particular explanatory relation between R, on the one hand, and her C'ing, on the other, and that object-involving representation represents that same explanatory relation under the category *ex post justifying*. Such a representation may be conceptual or nonconceptual, conscious or unconscious, accurate or inaccurate, and it may involve many different specific contents or guises. My claim here is simply that, *whatever else may be true of such a representation*, it is a *de se*, object-involving representation of a particular explanatory relation under the category *ex post justifying*.

This thesis is consistent with the obvious fact that it is possible for an agent to C for the reason R even when she doesn't know that she is C'ing, and doesn't know what her reason for C'ing is: this is quite common for mature humans, and even more common for the less mature. There might be reasons for which I am angry at my parents, but I might not know that I am angry at them, and also not know what those reasons are: it's possible for an agent to represent an explanatory relation between her reasons and her RDC even when she is not attentively or consciously representing it, and even when she radically misrepresents it. In fact, it is not just consistent with, but predicted by, my thesis that, whenever an agent C's for a bad reason R, the agent is *misrepresenting* (consciously or not) the explanatory relation between her C'ing and R: since the agent C's for the reason R, it follows that she represents the relation between R and C as *ex post justifying* even though, since R is not a good reason for C'ing, that relation is not actually *ex post justifying*.

Also, my thesis is consistent with the possibility of an agent's C'ing for the reason R *even when she also believes that R is not a good reason for C'ing*: in fact, my thesis has the noteworthy advantage of explaining why such cases involve a rational defect, or a kind of incoherence, on the part of the agent: such an agent would be both committed (by virtue of her C'ing for the reason R) to R being a good reason for C'ing, but also committed (by

31. Meltzoff (1995) says children have this ability by eighteen months; but Carpenter, Akhtar, and Tomasello (1998) argue that they have it even by fourteen months.

32. See Bugnyar, Reber, and Buckner 2016. Cameron Buckner (2017: 20) also cites recent work in comparative psychology to establish that "not only do some [nonhuman] animals have a subjective take on the suitability of the option they are evaluating for their goal, they possess a subjective, internal signal regarding their confidence in this take that can be deployed to select amongst different options."

her belief) to R not being a good reason for C'ing. Of course, whether this incoherence is a matter of *inconsistency* depends on the precise content of the object-involving representation involved in the agent's C'ing for the reason R. But even if the agent's object-involving representation is not *inconsistent* with her belief that R is not a good reason for C'ing, it may nonetheless be in rational conflict with that belief, just as preferences may be in rational conflict with each other, or different credal assignments to the same proposition may be in rational conflict with each other. We don't need to spell out the notion of rational conflict in general to appreciate such possibilities.

This last point about incoherence can help us to ascertain, in particular cases, whether an agent's C'ing stands in *the basing relation* to some specified reason. Suppose that Deepa is an expert cricket batter. According to Stanley and Krakauer 2013, expertise in a motor activity has two aspects: there is the expert's knowledge of how to perform the activity (which includes knowledge of when and where to do which things), and there is also the expert's motor acuity, that is, the ability to move her body in precisely the way that she knows she is supposed to. Let's suppose that Deepa has both of these components of expertise: she selects shots well (this is her know-how), and she also executes them well (this is her motor acuity). According to several recent studies on the shot selection of expert cricket batters,³³ shot selection is largely explained by visual information the batter receives by looking at how the bowler's arm moves between the time when the bowler's first foot hits the ground and the time at which the bowler's hand releases the ball. Is this explanatory relation between that visual information, on the one hand, and the batter's shot selection, on the other, a basing relation? Does Deepa—supposing her to be a typical expert cricket batter—select the shot she does *for the reason* that the bowler's arm moves in a particular way between the time when the bowler's first foot hits the grounds and the time at which the bowler releases the ball?

Of course, an expert cricket batter like Deepa typically does not—and certainly should not—attend to *her own representation* of the bowler's arm moving in that particular way: focusing attention on her own rep-

33. See Abernethy and Russell 1984, Gibson and Adams 1989, and Muller, Abernethy, and Farrow 2006. For a review of the occlusion studies that produced this finding, see Yarrow, Brown, and Krakauer 2009.

representations will degrade her performance.³⁴ Furthermore, Deepa might not even be able to conceptualize many of the structural features of the bowler's arm motion, for example, the ratio, at the moment of release, between the angle interior to the elbow and the angle interior to the wrist, or the explanatory connection between those particular structural features, on the one hand, and features of her shot selection, on the other. But all of these points are consistent with Deepa's selecting the shot she does *for the reason* that the bowler's arm moves in a particular way—a way that she might be able to specify only by means of ostension. (Let's use "W" to refer to the relevant way in which the bowler moves their arm. A particular arm movement will count as an instance of W just in case it has all of the properties of the bowler's arm movement that are explanatorily relevant to Deepa's shot selection.) So how can we ascertain whether Deepa's shot selection is *based on*, or merely *explained by*, the bowler's moving their arm in way W?

To answer this question, recall that representation involved in the basing relation is a *commitment-constituting* representation: it is in virtue of having a representation of the relevant kind that the agent is *committed* to R's being a good reason for her C'ing. Not every representation in an agent's cognitive system generates such commitments: for instance, an agent's visual cortex can represent complicated mathematical relations even if she has no commitments concerning such relations. So, to figure out whether Deepa's shot selection is based on, or merely explained by, the bowler's moving their arm in way W, we must consider whether Deepa is committed to W's being a good reason to select the shot that she does. And how can we tell whether she is so committed? One way to do so is by considering the normative implications of Deepa's *denying* that the bowler's moving their arm in way W is a good reason for her to select the particular shot that she selects. If Deepa issues this denial, is she thereby guilty of some incoherence? An affirmative answer to this question is good (though not conclusive) evidence that Deepa makes her shot selection *on the basis of* the bowler's moving their arm in way W: that's because one very plausible explanation of the incoherence is that Deepa's denial is in conflict with a commitment that she undertakes in basing her shot selection on the bowler's moving their arm in way W. To represent the explanatory relation between the bowler's moving in way W and her shot selection as *ex post* justifying is, *inter alia*, to be committed to the arm's

34. See Lohse, Sherwood, and Healy 2010 for a review of studies on the performance-degrading effect of attention to one's own mental states.

moving in way *W* being a good reason for that shot selection. Thus, if we consider the explanatory relation between the bowler's arm moving in way *W*, on the one hand, and Deepa's shot selection, on the other, one way to ascertain whether this explanatory relation is a basing relation is by considering what the normative implications would be of Deepa's denying that the former is a good reason for the latter.

A related way in which we can figure out whether Deepa's shot selection is based on, or merely explained by, the bowler's moving their arm in way *W* is to ask whether Deepa could be more or less *justified* in her shot selection. Not all of an agent's behavior can be more or less justified—her reflexes, for instance, may be adaptive or maladaptive, normal or abnormal, but not justified or unjustified. An agent's commitments, however, can all be more or less justified. If the explanatory route from the bowler's arm movement to Deepa's shot selection is a basing relation, then it involves Deepa's making a commitment that can be more or less justified. If, however, it is simply a causal process, then it need involve no such commitment, and may not be assessable as more or less justified.

Finally, another way that we can figure out whether Deepa's shot selection is based on, or merely explained by, the bowler's moving their arm in way *W* is to ask whether it is possible even in principle, given her conceptual repertoire, for Deepa to arrive at the conclusion, merely by reflecting on her own activity and without relying on empirical evidence, that the bowler's arm moving in way *W* is *why* she selects the shot she does? Recall that the only cases in which reflection alone can furnish us with knowledge of the reasons why we do the various contingent things we do (e.g., select the particular shot that we select) are those cases in which the *reason why* is a *reason for which*. Of course, it is often the case that we cannot know the reasons for which we do things. But it is a necessary condition of our knowing, by reflection alone, the reason why we think or feel or do something, that the reason in question is a reason *for which* we do it.

To identify a particular explanatory relation between one's reasons and one's RDC is not to deny that there are other correct explanations of why one has the RDC one has. Some psychologists have propounded a form of "will skepticism" on the basis of findings by Marc Jeannerod (2006) to the effect that our decisions are caused by factors that are temporally prior to our awareness of any reason for that decision.³⁵

35. For these psychologists, see, e.g., Levy and Bayne 2004, Prinz 2003, Frith 2014, and Wegner 2002.

But this skeptical argument makes two false assumptions. First, it falsely assumes that we cannot decide for a reason before becoming aware of that reason. And second, it falsely assumes that if there are reasons *why* we decide that are not also reasons *for which* we decide, then there cannot *also* be reasons for which we decide. But consider: we can explain why a particular peg doesn't fit into a particular hole by appeal to the fact that the peg is square and the hole is round, or by appeal to a complicated aggregate of molecular properties, but neither explanation invalidates the other. An explanandum may be correctly subsumed under two or more distinct explanatory patterns.

Finally, notice that, even though representing is itself an RDC that can be done for a reason, and can itself be more or less *ex post* justified, it does not follow that the object-involving representation involved in the basing relation is itself *ex post* justified only if the agent has *that* representation for a reason. As mentioned above, I leave it open that an RDC can be *ex post* justified even if there is no reason for which it is done. Of course, *if* an RDC can be *ex post* justified only if done for a reason, *then* this poses a threat of regress for the present account of basing, but the opponents of classical foundationalism have found many different ways to accommodate such a regress.³⁶

So basing one's C'ing on reason R involves the use of some representation of the category *ex post justifying* to represent an explanatory relation between one's C'ing and one's reason R. Just as it is possible to represent the visible distance between two objects even when one is ignorant or mistaken about what those two objects are, so too is it possible to represent the explanatory relation between R and one's C'ing, even when one is ignorant or mistaken about what R and C are. The basing relation can therefore obtain even between relata that are unclear to, or misidentified by, the agent, and it can even involve an explanatory relation the nature of which is unclear to, or misidentified by, the agent: what matters is that the explanatory relation is represented in an object-involving way, and as being *ex post justifying*, however precisely that latter property is represented.

In this section, I've given a characterization of the basing relation: it involves use of a representation of the category *ex post justifying* to represent, in an object-involving way, a disposition to C when R. Because the latter representation is object-involving, and so requires the obtaining of

36. Leite (2008) develops what I believe to be the most sophisticated and plausible way to accommodate such an apparent regress.

the disposition-exercise represented, it follows that the representation involved in basing—simple as it may be—guarantees the existence of the disposition-exercise involved in basing. But the disposition-exercise, I've also said, requires the existence of the representation involved in basing: it is the exercise of that specific disposition the exercises of which are individuated by just such representations. In the next section, I argue that we can develop this characterization of the basing relation in such a way that it adequately answers both of the questions set out in section 2, and meets the challenges I've posed to dispositionalism and to representationalism in section 3. Thus, the characterization of the basing relation that I've given in this section can be an adequate account of the basing relation.

5. Completing My Account of Basing

On my account, the basing relation *just is* that disposition-exercise that is *individuated* by our representing that very exercise itself, *de se*, under the category *ex post justifying*. The relevant disposition is exercised in a particular instance by virtue of that exercise's being represented in a particular way, whether or not that representation is accurate or adroit. Of course, when we C for the reason R, there may be lots of different dispositions that we are exercising—but *the basing relation is that particular disposition-exercise the identity and individuation conditions of which consist in its being the object of a de se, object-involving representation as ex post justifying*.

This proposal may strike some philosophers as metaphysically odd: *how can the exercise of a disposition be individuated by our representing that very exercise in thought? Doesn't the exercise have to occur independently of the representation in order to be represented?* To mitigate this sense of oddity and see how this might go, consider a Gricean account of a speaker's meaning in terms of reflexive intentions.³⁷ According to such an account, what it is for a speaker to tell a hearer, for example, that the cat is on the mat, is for a speaker to perform an intentional action *with the intention to produce in the hearer the belief that the cat is on the mat by virtue of the hearer's recognition of this very intention*. A speaker can perform such an intentional action in countless ways: by saying the English words "the cat is on the mat," or by writing some letters on a page, or by nodding and gesturing in the direction of

37. Grice (1957) introduces this account. Harman n.d. provides a convincing argument that self-representing representations are theoretically useful and need not lead to paradox. The present article is greatly indebted to that unpublished manuscript.

the mat, and so on. What makes it the case that one or another of these actions, performed in a particular context, *amounts to*, or *constitutes*, the speaker's telling the hearer that the cat is on the mat? It is that the action is performed *with the intention of producing in the hearer the belief that the cat is on the mat, by virtue of their recognizing that very intention*. Let's call this the speaker's "intention to communicate that the cat is on the mat." In other words, on the Gricean view, what makes it the case that the speaker's behavior constitutes the speech act of telling the hearer that the cat is on the mat is that the behavior is performed with the intention to communicate that the cat is on the mat. And what makes a particular intention the intention to communicate that the cat is on the mat is that the *intention represents itself in a particular way*—it is an intention to produce in one's audience a belief that the cat is on the mat by virtue of their recognizing that very intention. For an intention to be of this kind—an intention to communicate that p—it must represent itself as that intention the recognition of which in one's audience produces in them the belief that p. Philosophers familiar with this Gricean account should therefore find nothing unfamiliar about representations that get to be of a certain kind—that get to do a particular kind of explanatory work—by *representing themselves* in a particular way.

I've just said that, just as a particular intention gets to do the explanatory work of a Gricean intention to communicate by virtue of representing itself in a particular way, so too does a particular representation get to do the explanatory work of the basing relation by virtue of representing itself in a particular way. I think a helpful way of thinking about this comparison between Gricean intentions to communicate, on the one hand, and the representations that constitute the basing relation, on the other, is to think of both of them as doing the same kinds of explanatory work that a blueprint does in explaining the behavior of people who are building something in accordance with the specifications set out in that blueprint. A blueprint of, say, a house, can do at least two kinds of explanatory work. First, it is part of the causal explanation of various specific actions performed by various people: for example, the pouring of some concrete, or the hammering of some nails, or the drilling of some holes, and so. And second, the blueprint is also part of the metaphysical explanation of why all of these various specific actions collectively constitute the single action of, say, *building a house*. What makes the pouring of that concrete on Monday, and the hammering of those nails on Tuesday, and the drilling of those holes on Wednesday add up to the building of that house is that each of those particular actions is causally explained

in the same sort of way by the blueprint. The blueprint specifies a particular form, and the specification of that form both causes various particular actions to be performed and makes it the case that those particular actions collectively constitute a single action of building something in accordance with that form. The blueprint is thus what Aristotle would have called the “formal cause” of the act of building the house. Analogously, I claim, the Gricean intention to communicate that *p* is the formal cause of the act of telling one’s hearer that *p*. The act of telling one’s hearer that *p* consists of various specific actions (e.g., vocalizations, gestures, or inscriptions), and those specific actions are all caused by the Gricean intention to communicate that *p*, and collectively constitute a single act of telling by virtue of all being caused in the same way by the Gricean intention to communicate that *p*. And analogously, the object-involving representation of one’s exercise of the disposition to *C* when *R* as *ex post justifying* is the formal cause of one’s *C*’ing for the reason *R*. *C*’ing for the reason *R* consists of various specific events or states, and those specific events or states are all caused by that representation, and they collectively constitute the single phenomenon of the agent’s *C*’ing for the reason *R* by virtue of all being caused in the same way by that representation.³⁸

Thus, on my account, the representation that constitutes the basing relation is analogous in several ways to Gricean intentions to communicate. First, each kind of representation represents itself. Second, each kind of representation causally explains various *constituents* of the phenomenon that it is supposed to explain (the act of telling in one case, the basing relation in the other). And third, each kind of representation constitutes the unity of those various constituents into the single phenomenon that it is supposed to explain.³⁹

The basing relation obtains between *A*’s reason *R*, on the one hand, and *A*’s *C*’ing, on the other, when *A* exercises a disposition to *C* when *R* by virtue of representing that very disposition-exercise in an object-involving way under the category *ex post justifying*. Of course, you can have an object-involving representation of a thing only if that thing

38. Of course, the self-representing intention can enter into the causal explanation of various facts that are constituents of the agent’s *C*’ing without thereby being the cause of the agent’s *C*’ing: thus, the present proposal remains neutral on the dispute between causalists and anticausalists concerning the basing relation.

39. Such self-constituting self-representation is perhaps most famously exemplified by what Kant called “apperception”, which is an act that *constitutes* the unity of a single consciousness by *representing* that unity.

exists. So you can have an object-involving representation of a disposition-exercise only if that disposition-exercise occurs. But, according to this proposal, the disposition-exercise is itself individuated by that representation. It follows that the representation that we've described is both necessary and sufficient for the obtaining of the represented disposition-exercise. Since the disposition-exercise is the basing relation, it follows that the basing relation obtains *only when* an agent has an object-involving representation of that very relation under the category *ex post justifying*: the relevant representation cannot be a post hoc rationalization of one's past RDC. Our account thus offers nontrivial necessary and sufficient conditions for the obtaining of the basing relation. Let's see how this account meets the challenges that we've set out for the dispositionalist and the representationalist.

Consider again the representationalist's view:

- (R1) *basing* involves the agent's representing R as justifying C,
- (R2) *justifying basing* consists in the adroitness of this representation.

This view ran into the challenge of explaining cases in which one has such a representation, but still fails to base C on R. The only way for the representationalist to meet this challenge is for her to say that the representation involved in the basing relation is a representation that fixes the explanation of one's C'ing. And this is what my account of the basing relation does: the basing relation between R and one's C'ing is itself individuated by the agent's representing that very relation under the category *ex post justifying*. To represent that relation under this category is to be committed (correctly or not, and adroitly or not) to R's justifying C. The basing relation is actually justifying when the representation of that relation as *ex post justifying* is adroit. If and when an agent is justified in thinking that the representation is incorrect, that suffices for the representation (if she continues to have it) to be maladroit, and so makes her basing relation nonjustifying.

Consider again the dispositionalist's view:

- (D1) *basing* involves the agent's exercising a disposition to C when R,
- (D2) *justifying basing* consists in the agent properly exercising that disposition.

This view ran into the challenge of explaining the apparent possibility of *justifiably* C'ing, even though the disposition that one exercises in C'ing is a disposition that one is justified in taking oneself to be exercising

improperly. The only way for the dispositionalist to meet this challenge is to deny that this apparent possibility is really possible, and to say that the dispositions exercised in the basing relation are not dispositions that the agent can justifiably misidentify while exercising them. And this is what we've done here: the explanatory relation between R and C is the exercise of a disposition that occurs in virtue of one's representation of that very exercise as *ex post justifying*, and so in virtue of a representation that one can, by first-person reflection, know oneself to have. One might, of course, have false beliefs about various matters of fact to which one has such reflective access—but these false beliefs cannot be fully justified so long as one has reflective access to the facts that belie them.

Thus, to summarize, here is my account of the basing relation:

R is the *reason for which* an agent A C's = A has a *de se*, object-involving representation of her own exercise of a disposition to C when R, under the aspect *ex post justifying*, and that disposition-exercise is individuated by that very representation.

(Q1) When is a *reason why* also a *reason for which*?

Answer: A reason why is a reason for which just when the explanatory relation between the reason, on the one hand, and what it explains, on the other, is an explanatory relation that consists of a disposition-exercise individuated by the agent's *de se* object-involving representation of that very exercise as *ex post justifying*. Because the relation is individuated by the agent's own representation, if the agent has the capacity for first-person reflective access to her current representations, it will also be possible for her to enjoy such reflective access to the instances of the basing relation that obtain currently in her own case.

(Q2) What is the difference between *justifying* instances of the basing relation and *nonjustifying* ones?

Answer: An instance of the basing relation is justifying when the agent's object-involving representation of it under the category *ex post justifying* is adroit. Being justified in thinking, of an instance of the basing relation that currently obtains in oneself, that it is nonjustifying is sufficient to make that very instance of the basing relation (if it persists) maladroit, and therefore nonjustifying.

References

Abernethy, Bruce, and David Russell. 1984. "Advance Cue Utilisation by Skilled Cricket Batsmen." *Australian Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport* 16: 2–10.

- Anscombe, G. E. M. 1957. *Intention*. Basil Blackwell: Oxford.
- Boghossian, Paul. 2014. "What Is Inference?" *Philosophical Studies* 169: 1–18.
- Buckner, Cameron. 2017. "Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 95: 1–28.
- Bugnyar, Thomas, Stephan A. Reber, and Cameron Buckner. 2016. "Ravens Attribute Visual Access to Unseen Competitors." *Nature Communications* 7: 1–6.
- Carpenter, Malinda, Nameera Akhtar, and Michael Tomasello. 1998. "Fourteen-through Eighteen-Month-Old Infants Differentially Imitate Intentional and Accidental Actions." *Infant Behavior and Development* 21: 315–30.
- Cunningham, Joe. 2016. "Reflective Epistemological Disjunctivism." *Episteme* 13: 111–32.
- Dancy, Jonathan. 2000. *Practical Reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davidson, Donald. 1963. "Actions, Reasons, and Causes." *Journal of Philosophy* 60: 685–700.
- Evans, Ian. 2012. "The Problem of the Basing Relation." *Synthese* 190: 2943–57.
- Fantl, Jeremy, and Matthew McGrath. 2009. *Knowledge in an Uncertain World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Firth, Roderick. 1998. "Doxastic Warrant." In *In Defense of Radical Empiricism: Essays and Lectures by Roderick Firth*, edited by John Troyer, 335–47. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Frith, Christopher. 2014. "Acting, Agency, and Responsibility." *Neuropsychologia* 55: 137–42.
- Gibson, A. P. and R. D. Adams. 1989. "Batting Stroke Timing with a Bowler and a Bowling Machine: A Case Study." *Australian Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport* 21: 3–6.
- Goldman, Alvin. 1979. "What Is Justified Belief?" In *Justification and Knowledge*, edited by Georgios Sotiru Pappas, 1–23. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel.
- Grice, Paul. 1957. "Meaning." *Philosophical Review* 78: 147–77.
- Harman, Gilbert. n.d. "Self-Reflexive Thoughts." Unpublished manuscript.
- Hieronymi, Pamela. 2014. "Reflection and Responsibility." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 42: 3–41.
- Hornsby, Jennifer. 2007. "Knowledge, Belief, and Reasons for Acting." In *Explaining the Mental*, edited by Carlo Penco, Michael Beany, and Massimiliano Vignolo, 88–105. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Horowitz, Sophie. 2014. "Epistemic Akrasia." *Nous* 48: 718–44.
- Hyman, John. 2015. *Knowledge, Action, and Will*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jeannerod, Marc. 2006. *Motor Cognition: What Actions Tell the Self*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Korcz, Keith. 2000. "The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 30: 525–50.

- Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria. 2014. "Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 88: 314–45.
- Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria. Forthcoming. "Enkrasia or Evidentialism? Learning to Love Mismatch." *Philosophical Studies*.
- Lavin, Douglas. 2011. "Problems of Representationalism: Raz on Reason and Its Objects." *Jurisprudence* 2: 367–78.
- Lehrer, Keith. 1971. "How Reasons Give Us Knowledge; or, The Case of the Gypsy Lawyer." *Journal of Philosophy* 68: 311–3.
- Leite, Adam. 2004. "On Justifying and Being Justified." *Philosophical Issues* 14: 219–53.
- Leite, Adam. 2008. "Believing One's Reasons Are Good." *Synthese* 161: 419–41.
- Levy, Neil, and Bayne, Timothy. 2004. "A Will of One's Own: Consciousness, Control, and Character." *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry* 27: 459–70.
- Lohse, Keith, David Sherwood, and Alice Healy. 2010. "How Changing the Focus of Attention Affects Performance, Kinematics, and Electromyography in Dart Throwing." *Human Movement Science* 29: 542–55.
- Longino, Helen. 1978. "Inferring." *Philosophy Research Archives* 4: 19–26.
- Lord, Errol. 2016. "On the Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 92: 436–64.
- Lord, Errol, and Kurt Sylvan. Forthcoming. "Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)." In *Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Basing Relation*, edited by Joseph Adam Carter and Patrick Bondy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mantel, Susanne. 2017. "Three Cheers for Dispositions: A Dispositional Approach to Acting for a Normative Reason." *Erkenntnis* 82: 561–82.
- Marcus, Eric. 2012. *Rational Causation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- McCain, Kevin. 2012. "The Interventionist's Account of Causation and the Basing Relation." *Philosophical Studies* 159: 357–82.
- McDowell, John. 1984. "De Re Senses." *Philosophical Quarterly* 136: 283–94.
- McDowell, John. 2013. "Acting in the Light of a Fact." In *Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy*, edited by David Bankhurst, Brad Hooker, and Margaret Little, 13–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Meltzoff, Andrew. 1995. "Understanding the Intentions of Others: Re-enactment of Intended Acts by 18-Month-Old Children." *Developmental Psychology* 31: 838–50.
- Moser, Paul. 1989. *Knowledge and Evidence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Muller, Sean, Bruce Abernethy, and Damian Farrow. 2006. "How Do World-Class Cricket Batsmen Anticipate a Bowler's Intention?" *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology* 59: 2162–86.

- Neta, Ram. 2017. "Two Legacies of Goldman's Epistemology." *Philosophical Topics* 45: 121–36.
- Neta, Ram. 2018. "Rationally Determinable Conditions." *Philosophical Issues* 28, no. 1: 289–299.
- Neta, Ram. Forthcoming-a. "The Transparency of Inference." In *Inference and Consciousness*, edited by Timothy Chan and Anders Nes. Routledge: London.
- Neta, Ram. Forthcoming-b. "Agency and the Basing Relation." In *Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation*, edited by Patrick Bondy and Joseph Adam Carter. Routledge: London.
- Prinz, Wolfgang. 2003. "How Do We Know about Our Own Actions?" In *Voluntary Actions: Brains, Minds and Society*, edited by Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz, and Gerhard Roth, 21–33. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Scanlon, Thomas. 1998. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schroeder, Mark. 2008. "Having Reasons." *Philosophical Studies* 139: 57–71.
- Setiya, Kieran. 2013. "Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts." *Philosophical Issues* 23: 179–98.
- Silva, Paul. 2016. "How Doxastic Justification Helps Us to Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 10: 1–21.
- Skow, Brad. 2016. *Reasons Why*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, Angela. 2005. "Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life." *Ethics* 115: 236–71.
- Smithies, Declan. 2012. "Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 90: 723–41.
- Sosa, Ernest. 2015. *Judgment and Agency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stanley, Jason, and John Krakauer. 2013. "Motor Skill Depends on Knowledge of Facts." *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 7: 1–11.
- Swain, Marshall. 1979. "Justification and the Basis of Belief." In *Justification and Knowledge*, edited by George S. Pappas, 25–49. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel.
- Swain, Marshall. 1981. *Reasons and Knowledge*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Swain, Marshall. 1985. "Justification, Reasons, and Reliability." *Synthese* 64: 69–92.
- Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1967. "Reasons and Reasoning." In *Philosophy in America*, edited by Max Black, 282–303. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Titelbaum, Michael. 2015. "Rationality's Fixed Point." *Oxford Studies in Epistemology* 5: 253–94.
- Tolliver, Joseph. 1982. "Basing Beliefs on Reasons." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 15: 149–61.
- Turri, John. 2009. "On the Ontology of Epistemic Reasons." *Nous* 43: 490–512.
- Turri, John. 2010. "On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 80: 312–26.

The Basing Relation

- Unger, Peter. 1975. *Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Valaris, Markos. 2014. "Reasoning and Regress." *Mind* 123: 101–27.
- van Wietmarschen, Han. 2013. "Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Foundedness." *Philosophical Review* 122: 395–425.
- Wedgwood, Ralph. 2012. "Justified Inference." *Synthese* 189: 273–95.
- Wegner, Daniel. 2002. *The Illusion of Conscious Will*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Winters, Barbara. 1983. "Inferring." *Philosophical Studies* 44: 201–20.
- Worsnip, Alex. 2018. "The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 96: 3–44.
- Yarrow, Kielan, Peter Brown, and John Krakauer. 2009. "Inside the Brain of an Elite Athlete: The Neural Processes that Support High Achievement in Sports." *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 10: 585–96.