Last week we started talking about Kant’s conception of free action. This week we’ll try and get clearer as to the notion of ‘control’ that lies behind this conception of free action. In terms of readings from Kant we’ll be focusing on much of the same material from last week plus a few other things.
I want to focus our discussion around the following questions:
- Is Kant’s conception of absolute spontaneity made more intelligible by appeal to his view of control?
- What is the connection, for Kant, between control and responsibiilty?
- Does control require choice?
- If rational acts are all and only those that are under one’s control, and control is dependent on choice how does Kant avoid (if he does) an implausibly voluntaristic position?
- Handout for week 3
Readings
- Kant:
- Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: part II, 4:412-4:414; part III, 4:446-9
- Review of Schultz
- Read the whole thing, but focus on the argument starting from the first full paragraph on 8:13 to the end.
- Critique of Practical Reason: 5:94-101
- Secondary readings:
- Kohl, “Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought”
- Cohen, “Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility”
- (Optional) McLear, “Control”
- (Optional) Korsgaard, “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant”