This week we continue our discussion of Kant’s conception of basing and inference. In particular I want us to try and get clear on the sense in which Kant distinguishes two different kinds of inferential activity. The first, “immediate” inference, is carried out by the understanding. The second, “mediate” inference, is carried out by the faculty of reason (here as a subfaculty, and not a synonym for the intellect as a whole). What, if anything, is the difference between these two kinds of activity? Assuming there is something distinctive about the activity of reason as such, what is it? And can answering this question help us understand another enormously puzzling claim that Kant makes:
Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason. (GII, 4:412)
So, questions to consider include:
- What is the difference between mediate and immediate inference?
- If every faculty has a distinctive kind of activity, what is the distinctive activity of (the subfaculty of) reason?
- What does Kant mean by saying that reason is required for the derivation of action from laws? Is this connected to its distinctive function?
- What is a principle? Is it the representation of a law?
- Handout for week 5
Readings
- Kant
- Critique of Pure Reason: On Pure Reason A298-309/B355-366
- Kant’s discussion of reason as a faculty, focusing mostly on theoretical or ‘speculative’ reason
- Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: part I, 4:393-403 (in PP 49-57)
- Kant’s initial analysis of the concept of duty, discussion of the will, and of maxims of action
- Critique of Practical Reason: 1.i.1-4; 5:19-28 (in PP 153-62)
- A discussion of practical laws, maxims, and principles – this recaps some of the material discussed in the Groundwork
- Metaphysics of Morals: §§II-III, 6:211-14, 6:221-28 (in PP 373-82)
- An overview of Kant’s moral psychology – note the clear difference between will and choice
- Critique of Pure Reason: On Pure Reason A298-309/B355-366
- Secondary readings (Optional):
- Willaschek, Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics, chs. 1-2
- Overview of Kant’s conception of reason in the first Critique
- Grier, “Transcendental Illusion”
- Overview of Kant on reason; particularly of interest to us is the discussion of reason in the second section, “Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion”
- Engstrom, “Reason, Desire, and the Will”
- Discussion of Kant’s conception of reason, desire, and will
- Johnson, “The Moral Law as Causal Law”
- Discussion of the sense in which the moral law is universal; Johnson’s claim is that it’s universality stems from the fact that it is a form of causality, and all causality is lawful
- Willaschek, Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics, chs. 1-2