This week we continue our discussion of Kantian compatibilist theories of rationality. We’ll look at Harry Frankfurt’s influential non-causalist conception of intentional action, along with his related conception of the “identification” of an agent with its actions. We’ll compare it to Henry Allison’s influential idea that Kant considers rational action to involve “incorporation” of a desire or impulse as one’s reason.
- Handout for week 7
Readings
- Kant
- Religion Within the Boundaries of Reason Alone (excerpt): 6:22-26
- This is where Kant articulates what Henry Allison calls the “Incorporation Thesis”—i.e. the claim that a desire or impulse constitutes a reason for action only insofar as it has been incorporated by the subject into its maxim of action
- Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (excerpt, see especially pp. 39-40 on incorporation)
- Religion Within the Boundaries of Reason Alone (excerpt): 6:22-26
- Frankfurt
- Other Readings (Optional)
- Velleman, “Identification & Identity” (with a reply by Frankfurt)
- Bratman, “Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency”
- Korsgaard, “The Authority of Reflection” (excerpt)
- Schapiro, “Foregrounding Desire: A Defense of Kant’s Incorporation Thesis”