This week we conclude (at least for the time being) our discussion of Kant on reason and principles. We then look at the sense in which Kant’s source incompatibilism and its attendant metaphysics might be understood to be an optional or non-essential part of his overall view concerning rational agency, particularly as that view is developed by Christine Korsgaard.
- Handout for week 6
Readings
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Kant:
- Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: part II, 4:440-45 (PP 89-93); part III, 4:446-53 (PP 94-100)
- Review of Schultz
- Read the whole thing, but focus on the argument starting from the first full paragraph on 8:13 to the end.
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Korsgaard,
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Other secondary readings (Optional):
- Ameriks, “Kant and Hegel on Freedom”
- Don’t worry about the discussion of Hegel, but Ameriks lays out a case for thinking that Kant’s incompatbilism is purely optional
- Kohl, “Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative”
- Aims to show how compatibilist readings of Kant are mistaken, and that Kant has sound philosophical grounds for advocating his version of incompatibilism
- Velleman, “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics”
- Very clear and accessable introduction to a broadly “non-metaphysical” and compatibilist conception of Kant’s position; see especially the section “The Idea of Freedom”
- Vilhauer, “Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant’s Theory of Free Will”
- A case for why Kant has to be an incompatibilist and how his metaphysics supports this
- Vaida, “The Problem of Agency and the Problem of Accountability in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”
- Discusses the role of the conception of freedom in Kant’s account of rational agency and argues that it plays a role only with respect to moral agency, not rationality generally
- Ameriks, “Kant and Hegel on Freedom”